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I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous article,1 I examined judicial opinions in cases in
which law clerks have gone wild, principally by doing things that
law clerks just aren‘t supposed to do, such as convening court,2 conducting independent factual investigations into matters before their

* Adjunct Professor, The University of New Hampshire School of Law, Concord, N.H. By day, the author works as a law clerk for a federal judge.
1. See Parker B. Potter, Jr., Law Clerks Gone Wild, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 173
(2010); see also Parker B. Potter, Jr., Judges Gone Wild, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. __
(forthcoming) (discussing opinions in which judges have gone wild by referring to
their law clerks in print); Parker B. Potter, Jr., The Rhetorical Power of Law
Clerks, 40 SW. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming) (discussing the use of law clerks as a
rhetorical device in judicial opinions).
2. See Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1118 (9th Cir. 1995).
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judges,3 or leaking drafts of opinions to the press.4 Here, I focus on
opinions in federal cases that discuss two other categories of unusual
law-clerk activity, serving as a source of evidence, and going to
court, as a litigant.5
The article is informed by my ten years of experience as a trialcourt law clerk in the state and federal courts of New Hampshire.
Things that caught my eye, and made it into the article, are incidents
I read about in judicial opinions that struck me as very different from
anything I had ever seen or heard about through the law-clerk grapevine. My purpose is two-fold. First, many of the opinions I discuss
are downright entertaining. But beyond that, the unusual fact patterns that make those opinions entertaining also serve to point out
things that might happen to a law clerk that are not covered in law
school or the typical law-clerk training program. Accordingly, I intend for the article to have a practical dimension that underpins its
entertainment value.
In Part II, I explore opinions in which law clerks have become
sources of evidence in cases they were working on, as producers of
exhibits, as affiants, or as witnesses. In discussing those opinions, I
3. See Kennedy v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 551 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir.
1977).
4. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 403–04 (Buckley, J., concurring).
5. I did come across one law clerk who was so far out of context that his situation defies categorization. Specifically, the memorandum opinion in Bethea v.
Bristol Lodge Corp. lists counsel for two of the defendants as follows: ―Robert M.
Britton, Philadelphia, PA, Jason H. Casell, Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael
M. Baylson, United States District Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants Godiva‘s Bristol, Inc. and Divas Partners, Inc.‖ No. Civ.A. 01-612, 2003 WL 21146146, at *1
(E.D. Pa. May 19, 2003). And, just in case reading about Judge Baylson‘s law
clerk appearing before another judge in the same district is not titillating enough,
one needs only read the second paragraph of the opinion to discover that one of
law clerk Casell‘s clients was associated with ―Divas International Gentlemen‘s
Club . . ., a restaurant and bar that provides entertainment in the form of topless
dancing.‖ Id.; cf. Doctor John‘s, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1022,
1027 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (judge sent law clerks out to examine ―adult book store‘s
storefront display‖); Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted, 370 F. Supp. 506, 507–08
(D.N.J.), rev’d, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974) (unpublished table decision) (judge
sent law clerks on ―fact finding mission‖ to establishment offering ―nude interpretive dancing‖). Talk about law clerks out of context, not to mention a pretty nifty
use of the ―cf.‖ signal!
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focus on both the process by which law clerks have become sources
of evidence and the topics on which they have been asked to give
evidence. Part III is devoted to cases in which law clerks have been
litigants, and it serves as a guide to situations in which litigation is,
and is not, a productive option for a law clerk who believes that he
or she has been wronged.
II. I SPY WITH MY LAW CLERK‘S EYE
As a law clerk, I am accustomed to reading affidavits and listening to witness testimony. Making affidavits and giving testimony,
however, are beyond my range of experience. And, indeed, the general rule is that information law clerks may have acquired during the
course of their work as law clerks is inaccessible as evidence. As
Judge Gilberto Gierbolini helpfully explained:
Equally meritless is appellant‘s contention that hearsay
considerations give appellant the right to cross-examine the
judge‘s law clerk due to the judge‘s statement that the law
clerk assisted her in interpreting the disclosure statement.
Section 1 of the Federal Judicial Center’s Law Clerk Handbook, establishes in relevant part that:
A law clerk is a lawyer employed to assist a judge
with as many administrative, clerical, and basic legal
tasks as possible, so as to leave the judge more time
for judging and critical decision-making . . . . Many
judges discuss pending cases with their law clerks
and confer with them about decisions . . . . The bankruptcy court clerk likewise participates in the broad
range of tasks performed by the bankruptcy judge as a
trial judge.
Pp. 1-2.
Clearly Judge de Jesús was entitled to seek and benefit
from her law clerk‘s knowledge of accounting. Moreover,
we are convinced by the record that, as exemplified by her
careful questioning of appellant‘s accountant, she never delegated to her law clerk her duty to make the ultimate decision
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in this case. We remind appellant that law clerks are ―simply
extensions of the judges at whose pleasure they serve.‖ Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988), citing Oliva v.
Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). The presiding judge at a trial may not testify as a witness in that trial.
Rule 605 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Nor can a judge
be subpoenaed to testify. United States v. Alberico, 453 F.
Supp. 178 (D. Colo. 1977). Allowing cross-examination of a
presiding judge would convert him or her into a witness. See
also Ouachita National Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291
(8th Cir. 1982), on rehearing, 716 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1983).
Since a judge cannot testify in a case in which he/she is presiding, it follows that the judge‘s law clerk, who is an extension of the judge, also may not testify.
The above can be expressed in a classical Aristotelian
syllogism:
Major premise: An attorney cannot cross-examine the
presiding judge regarding matters already decided or under
the consideration of the judge;
Minor premise: Law clerks are extensions of the judge.
Conclusion: An attorney cannot cross-examine a law
clerk under the above premises.6
In a recent case in which he allowed the counsel to a Special Master
not to testify at a hearing conducted by the Special Master, Judge
Eldon Fallon put things somewhat more succinctly: ―[T]his situation
was the same or similar to the situation in which a party sought to
call the Court‘s law clerk to testify which is routinely disallowed.‖7
Indeed, subpoenas for law clerks seem to be quashed as a matter of
course.8 In quashing the subpoenas at issue in Terrazas v. Slagle,
Judge Sam Sparks elaborated, with considerable eloquence:

6. In re M.E.S., Inc., 148 B.R. 1, 3 (D.P.R. 1992).
7. Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 2d 797, 806 (E.D. La. 2008).
8. See, e.g., Terrazas v. Slagle, 142 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Tex. 1992); see also
Loubser v. Pala, No. 4:04 CV 75, 2007 WL 3232136, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 29,
2007) (quashing ―non-party subpoena [served] on Kevin Smith, the Clerk of the
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All counsel admit that public inquiries by the litigants as
to the internal operations and communications of the Court
will, not may, destroy the integrity of our present legal system. This Court will not be a party to that destruction.
Clearly the object of deposing these law clerks is to disqualify the judges, which power lies first with the judges themselves, and then with the United States Supreme Court or
possibly the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event the
Defendants choose to file a petition for writ of mandamus.
Asking this judge to find deposing the judges‘ law clerks necessary under these circumstances is a usurpation of Judges
Nowlin, Garwood, and Smith‘s authority and responsibilities.
The judges, with full knowledge of the facts, have already
determined there is no basis to require their recusal.
This Court will not be a party to permit the litigants to
question law clerks of United States Judges and/or the United
States Judges themselves with regard to their conduct in their
determination of judicial decisions or their reasons for those
decisions, and this Court will not be a party to assist the Defendants‘ counsel to disqualify these judges.9
As Judge Harold Baer explained, in similar circumstances:
I declined to grant Ms. Peters‘ request to have myself or my
law clerk testify. I noted that legal and policy considerations
prevent a judge who is presiding over a trial from being
called as a witness or subjected to discovery, and this applies
to evidentiary hearings as well. I noted, moreover, that Ms.
Peters‘ motion for recusal further undercut her efforts to obIndiana Supreme Court, seeking the names of all law clerks and cases on which
each clerk worked during the course of a four-year period‖); United States v. Roebuck, 271 F. Supp. 2d 712, 717 (D.V.I. 2003) (―Judge Moore sua sponte quashed
the subpoenas served on the law clerks as being unreasonable and unduly oppressive.‖). Roebuck involved, among other things, an attorney‘s attempt to have a
judge recuse himself based upon her belief that the judge had responded negatively to her letter to the editor opposing the judge‘s reappointment. Id. at 714–15.
For those who relish a good donnybrook between bench and bar, Roebuck is worth
a read. See also United States v. Roebuck, 289 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.V.I. 2003).
9. Terrazas, 142 F.R.D. at 139–40 (footnotes omitted).
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tain the testimony of my law clerk . . . which is equally protected. Where a litigant has sought to depose a law clerk in a
case where a recusal motion is pending, courts have typically
denied the testimony, as allowing the law clerk to testify
would in most cases dictate recusal.10
However, notwithstanding the general prohibition against extracting evidence from law clerks, law-clerk evidence in a variety of
forms has found its way into court. Sometimes, a judge will refer
10. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Scivantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448, 533
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (footnotes, citations, and internal punctuation marks omitted),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 564 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009).
In United States v. Ferguson, Judge Edward Weinfeld did disqualify himself,
when a contrary decision would have placed him in the position of passing on the
truthfulness of certain grand jury testimony offered by a former law clerk. 550 F.
Supp. 1256, 1259–60 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). According to Judge Weinfeld:
The issue then is not the Court‘s own introspective capacity to sit in fair
and honest judgment with respect to the controverted issues, but whether
a reasonable member of the public at large, aware of all the facts, might
fairly question the Court‘s impartiality. This is an objective standard and
―where the question is close, the judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned must recuse himself from the trial.‖ My relationship to
Pomerantz is so intimate and my esteem for him so high, as it is for all
my many clerks through the years, that the ―average person on the street‖
might reasonably conclude that no matter how strongly the Court states
that Pomerantz‘s testimony will not enter into its judgment, nonetheless,
in some imperceptible manner his testimony will intrude itself and be
considered with respect to the suppression motions. This situation is
quite unlike the prior motion to disqualify because a former law clerk had
been assigned to prosecute the case. The mere fact of close relationship
did not require disqualification. In this instance, however, credibility is a
vital issue.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Vaughn v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 526 F. Supp.
1165 (E.D. Ark. 1981) presented a similar situation:
Counsel for plaintiff countered with an affidavit to the effect that one of
this Court‘s law clerks had advised him that it was all right to wait to file
his request for an allowance of fees. The law clerk involved filed his own
affidavit, stating that no such advice had been given, whereupon this
Court, feeling that it would give at least the appearance of impropriety for
it to sit in judgment on the credibility of one of its own employees, recused itself. The case was then reassigned to another judge for a ruling
on the then-pending question of attorneys‘ fees.
Id. at 1167–68.
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informally to being provided with information by law clerks.11 More
frequently, a judge will make, or write, an off-hand comment about
his or her reliance on the recollection12 or the notes13 of a law clerk
11. See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 n.15
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (―The fourth version [of a television commercial] continues to
run, and all three of my law clerks saw it broadcast during the weekend of January
1, 2005 at different times, including twice during the broadcast of the New York
Giants-Dallas Cowboys football game.‖); In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., No. 95 C 7679, MDL No. 1083, 1996 WL 197671, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22,
1996) (reporting ―what this Court‘s law clerk has reported that he heard on National Public Radio‖); United States v. Kilpatrick, 575 F. Supp. 325, 341 (D. Colo.
1983) (―[T]he atmosphere of the trial . . . was an atmosphere of unfairness and
overreaching illustrated in small degree by ex parte telephone calls to my law
clerk made by government counsel inquiring through the back door to learn my
thinking as to some legal situations in the case. (Colloquy about this appears in
the record, and, consistent with their denials of what so many others say, government counsel deny my law clerk‘s statements as to the conversation.)‖).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that district judge had found that defendant was present in court based in part on
―the judge‘s indication that his law clerk recalled that Sanchez had been present‖);
Dominion Nutrition, Inc. v. Cesca, 467 F. Supp. 2d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (―I
glanced over at the jury and saw juror B, still sitting on A‘s immediate right, swivel toward A and smile or smirk. I did not notice A‘s reaction, but my law clerks,
who corroborated my observation, told me they‘d seen A nod emphatically in
response to B. Apparently no one else in the courtroom observed the incident.‖);
Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F. Supp.
1013, 1020 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (―I have conferred with my law clerk, Mrs. Deere
who has assisted me in this case, and she has no recollection of such a motion or
order being given to her.‖); Farkas v. Ellis, 768 F. Supp. 476, 478 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (responding to plaintiff‘s claim, in motion to recuse, that he failed to quell
―lewd hand gestures and offensive vocal insults‖ during conference, Judge William Connor noted that neither he ―nor his law clerk, who attended the conference,
saw any such gestures‖); United States v. Andrews, 754 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 n.2
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (―Although there was not a court reporter present at the meeting,
the Court and its two law clerks recall that the government did no more than
present a ‗sales pitch‘ for a single trial.‖); Durflinger v. Artiles, 563 F. Supp. 322,
327 (D. Kan. 1981) (―The Court did not exclude Dr. Dyck as a witness. Unfortunately, this dispute was resolved in chambers at a time when the court reporter was
not present. It is the Court‘s recollection, and that of two of his law clerks, who
were present, that the Court stated that he could not exclude Dr. Dyck.‖). But see
Wolters Kluwer, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 456 n.28 (―Because Ms. Peters has put in issue
ex parte and/or untranscribed conversations with myself or my law clerk by seeking the testimony of myself or my law clerk regarding those conversations in connection with her motion for my recusal, I will not rely on any independent recol-
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in reconstructing some aspect of a case. Those references are of relatively little interest other than as a gentle warning to law clerks to
keep their notes legible and presentable.
Of greater interest are cases in which law-clerk evidence has
been introduced more formally. In the following section, I begin
with a discussion of cases in which documents generated by law
clerks have become exhibits at a hearing or trial. Next, I turn to cases involving affidavits from law clerks. I conclude with cases in
which law clerks have been called upon to offer oral testimony. As a
bit of a leitmotif in my discussions of law-clerk affidavits and testilection of myself or my law clerk as to the arguments Ms. Peters made in Chambers at this time.‖).
13. See Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 685 F. Supp. 2d 557, 572 (W.D. Pa. 2010)
(―[A]ccording to notes of the law clerk who attended the conference on December
17, 2009, [plaintiffs‘ counsel] did not advise the Court of this commitment and we
therefore find no reason to grant an additional extension on that basis.‖); Ass‘n
Concerned About Tomorrow, Inc. v. Slater, 40 F. Supp. 2d 823, 826 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (―Based on the pleadings, the evidence adduced at the July 1998 hearing,
the stipulations, the arguments of counsel, the notes of the Court and the law clerk,
the Court concludes that the Defendants have complied with the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act . . . .‖); Adams v. Rivera, 13 F. Supp. 2d
550, 551 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (―Plaintiff‘s attorney also contends that a conversation with Chambers caused him to believe, to his detriment, that if he and defense
counsel were unable to agree upon fees, the Court would overlook the 14-day time
limit in considering plaintiff‘s motion . . . . [T]he notes and recollection of the law
clerk with whom plaintiff‘s counsel spoke clearly reflect that Chambers never
stated or implied that a motion for attorneys‘ fees, if filed, would not be dismissed
on timeliness grounds.‖); Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F. Supp. 879, 905
(D.V.I. 1996) (―THIS COURT issued an Opinion and Order in the abovecaptioned case signed and dated February 15, 1996. The Court subsequently
learned that an error appeared on page 227 of Volume 2 of the transcript from the
hearing on plaintiffs‘ motion for preliminary injunction . . . . This Court consulted
its own recollection of the testimony, the law clerk‘s notes, and the affidavit of
William M. Karr . . . . Each of these confirmed that thirty-two percent is the correct figure. The Court reporter has issued a correction to the transcript.‖) (footnote
omitted); Glover v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 808, 830 n.15 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (―I did
not admit plaintiffs‘ exhibit 46 at the time it was marked. There is no indication in
the record that I admitted plaintiffs‘ exhibit 46 thereafter. My handwritten bench
notes, and those of my law clerk, are in accord that the exhibit was neither offered
for admission nor admitted. It appears that the court reporter, William Rittinger,
did not appreciate the distinction between marking an exhibit for purposes of identification and admitting it into evidence.‖).
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mony, I organize those sections on the basis of who sought the law
clerks‘ evidence, beginning with cases in which that evidence has
been elicited by parties and then moving to the more unusual situation in which evidence has been elicited by the court itself.
A. Exhibiting Law-Clerk Work
It is one thing for a judge to make a passing reference to information gleaned informally from a law clerk. It is another thing for
some bit of evidence created by a law clerk to make it into an opinion as an actual exhibit. Notwithstanding the general rule that law
clerks are paid to examine exhibits rather than create them, there are
more than a few examples of documents generated by law clerks that
have become exhibits.
The most common kind of law-clerk exhibit is a communication
from a law clerk to a party that the party subsequently introduces as
evidence. For example, in Myers v. United States District Court,14
the plaintiff in a civil case in the district court petitioned for a writ of
mandamus after the district court set his case for trial without a jury,
and he attached, as an exhibit to his petition, a letter from the trial
judge‘s law clerk informing him that his letter to the judge ―inquiring whether [the judge] had been inadvertent in eliminating the jury
. . . would be deemed a jury demand and that ‗(a) jury (would) be
called for the trial as a matter of course, without further action by
counsel.‘‖15 The court of appeals issued the writ.16 In Berger v.
Stinson,17 the federal judge ruling on a habeas corpus petition referred to a letter from the state trial judge‘s law clerk to show that,
when ruling on the petitioner‘s motion for a new trial, the trial judge
had not relied upon a particular bit of evidence.18 And, in United
States ex rel. Walker v. Follette,19 a letter to a criminal defendant
from the law clerk of the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals was introduced to demonstrate, in the context of a habeas cor14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

620 F.2d 741, 742 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 743.
Id. at 744.
97 F. Supp. 2d 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id. at 362.
274 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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pus petition, that the defendant had exhausted his state remedies.20
Communications from law clerks have also been cited in arguments
that previous state-court convictions did not support a sentence enhancement in a subsequent federal case,21 that a prison had no basis
for barring a prisoner from a work assignment he wanted because
certain charges against him had been dropped,22 and that the federal
Bureau of Prisons had improperly calculated the sentence of a criminal defendant.23
Judges, as well, will cite to communications from law clerks to
parties, typically to point out that a party has been placed on notice
of some procedural aspect of a case, such as a request for supple-

20. Id. at 182. Also, in the habeas context, in Lindsey v. Cain, the only available
documentation that a state trial court had denied a criminal defendant‘s claims for
post-conviction relief was ―a minute entry indicating that the post-conviction application submitted May 13, 2004 was denied by the court . . . and a letter from
Judge Hunter‘s law clerk to petitioner stating that the post-conviction pleadings
filed February 24, 2003 and again on May 13, 2004 had been denied.‖ Civil Action No. 05-1593, 2009 WL 1575466, at *8 n.38 (E.D. La. May 29, 2009) (citation
to the record omitted).
21. See United States v. Catlett, Nos. 4:05CR00275 SWW, 4:07CV01135 SWW,
2008 WL 3271560, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 7, 2008) (―Catlett also submits a copy of
a letter dated May 12, 2008, addressed to Catlett from a state court law clerk. The
letter reads as follows . . . .‖).
22. Nicholas v. Kanode, Civil Action No. 7:07-cv-00576, 2007 WL 4376145, at
*1 n.3 (W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2007) (―Plaintiff submits a copy of a letter . . . from a
law clerk for the La Crosse County Circuit Court . . . indicating that charges
against plaintiff were dismissed . . . .‖).
23. Dorsey v. Driver, Civil Action No. 1:07CV82, 2008 WL 4534351, at *1
(N.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2008). Moreover, in response to the Dorsey petitioner‘s
challenge to the law clerk‘s credibility, Magistrate Judge John Kaull wrote:
Of the three Judgment and Commitment Orders entered in petitioners‘ criminal case, not one of those orders states that the petitioner‘s D.C.
sentence is to run concurrent to his violator sentence. Moreover, according to Judge Gardner‘s law clerk [Benjamin Kull], the audio of the petitioner‘s sentence specifically refutes the petitioner‘s claims that the sentencing judge intended for his sentences to run concurrent. Although the
petitioner questions the credibility of Judge Gardner‘s law clerk, the petitioner has provided no evidence which would make this Court doubt the
credibility or accuracy of Mr. Kull‘s statements of the case.
Id. at *3.
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mental briefing,24 ―the opportunity to comment on a proposed order,‖25 the need to respond to a motion to dismiss,26 the option of
delaying a trial,27 or the inapplicability of the limitation period established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).28 While the most common type of law-clerk exhibit is a
communication from a law clerk to a party, on relatively rare occasion, an opinion has cited to more internal law-clerk communica-

24. John Gil Constr., Inc. v. Riverso, 99 F. Supp. 2d 345, 356 n.19 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (citing ―letter from Rachel G. Skaistis, law clerk to Judge Scheindlin‖).
25. Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, Nos. 07 Civ. 1241(SAS), 07 Civ.
7862(SAS), 2009 WL 454275, at *1 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2009) (citing
―Email from Daniel Freeman, law clerk to Judge Scheindlin‖).
26. Cornish v. Norris Square United Presbyterian Cong‘n, No. 07-CV-3678,
2009 WL 1492662, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2009).
27. Wood v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., No. 4:05-CV-00124GTE, 2006 WL
897656, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 5, 2006).
28. Davidson v. United States, No. 00-CV-00869, 2000 WL 1772656, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000). In Davidson, the petitioner ―asked this court whether
the then-newly enacted AEDPA would apply retroactively to him and, thus, require him to file his § 2255 motion by April 22, 1997.‖ Id. ―By reply letter dated
March 17, 1997, this court, by its law clerk, advised Davidson that language contained in Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011 (2d Cir. 1997) and Reyes v.
Keane, 90 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 1996) suggested that the AEDPA‘s statute of limitations did not apply to him and, therefore, he would not need an extension of time
to file his § 2255 motion.‖ Id. Subsequently, both Lozada and Reyes were overruled. See id. at *1 n.1. In response, the petitioner argued ―that, but for this
court‘s letter assuring him that he was not subject to the one-year statute of limitations, he would have timely filed his § 2255 motion.‖ Id. at *2. The court agreed:
Here, Davidson‘s detrimental reliance on this court‘s March 1997 letter advising him that the statute of limitations did not apply to his § 2255
motion constitutes a rare and exceptional circumstance which warrants
equitable tolling. If not for the letter, Davidson may have timely filed his
motion. In addition, Davidson cannot be faulted for the delay in filing his
motion. Davidson undoubtedly read this court‘s letter to mean that he
was operating under § 2255 as it existed prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA. Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, of course, Davidson
could have made his motion ―at any time.‖ See Mickens v. United States,
148 F.3d [145,] 147 [(2d Cir. 1998)]. Given the rare circumstances surrounding this motion, the court determines that Davidson acted with reasonable diligence. In sum, the court is compelled to equitably toll the statute of limitations and deem Davidson‘s submission timely filed.
Id.
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tions, including an e-mail from a law clerk to a clerk of court,29 a law
clerk‘s ―minutes‖ of a settlement conference,30 a memorandum to
chambers from a law clerk,31 and a memorandum for the file.32 In
McGarvey v. Penske Automotive Group, Inc., one party made the
bold move of relying on a law clerk‘s bench memo from another
court.33 In the words of a rather incredulous Judge Jerome Simandle:
Perhaps as a result of the absence of authority interpreting
section 2302(c), the parties devote considerable attention to a
document submitted by Plaintiffs in support of their summary judgment motion, which Plaintiffs characterize as the
opinion of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division in
the matter of Baldino v. Classic Nissan of Turnersville, and
which Defendants characterize as a bench memorandum
from ―Matt Hill‖ to ―Judge Morgan‖ in that matter. In the
document, which is difficult to read and which is heavily
marked with underlines and handwritten observations, Matt
Hill appears to advise Judge Morgan that a warranty identical
to that at issue herein ―likely violates the anti-tying provisions of the MMWA because the underlying goal of preserving consumer choice is stifled.‖ Plaintiffs argue that the document ―was adopted, along with its reasoning, as . . . [Judge
29. Byrne v. Liquid Asphalt Sys., Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 84, 87 n.1 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (―According to chamber‘s records, after the time allotted by the rules had
passed without a response from Plaintiffs, the Court instructed the deputy clerk to
call Plaintiffs‘ counsel. This request is memorialized in an e-mail dated November
14, 2002. (E-mail from Alicia Huffman, law clerk to Judge Gregory Carman, to
Susan Duong, deputy clerk for the Eastern District of New York (Nov. 14, 2002,
09:45 EST) (on file with Judge Gregory W. Carman).).‖).
30. Schwartzman, Inc. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 167 F.R.D. 694, 696 (D.N.M. 1996).
31. Lebron v. Powell, 217 F.R.D. 72, 73 (D.D.C. 2003) (―A memorandum to my
chambers filed by my law clerk indicates that on August 23, 2000 I spoke to counsel who advised me that they were creating a new proposed schedule.‖).
32. United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 196 n.10 (2d Cir. 1973) (―The statement of facts of the incident [involving a jury question] is drawn from memoranda
dictated by the trial judge, his law clerk and the deputy court clerk shortly after
defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the delay in answering the [jury‘s]
reasonable doubt note.‖).
33. 639 F. Supp. 2d 450, 458 n.9 (D.N.J. 2009).
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Morgan‘s] determination in denying defendants‘ motion to
dismiss in Baldino . . . .‖ In support of this argument, Plaintiffs‘ attorney, Simon Paris, Esq., states in a sworn certification that he
spoke to Ann Marie Cohen, New Jersey Superior
Court-Law Division, Gloucester County, Civil Division-Team Leader. Ms. Cohen confirmed with Judge
Morgan that the accompanying Memorandum of Law
from Matt Hill . . . [was] incorporated into the February 18, 2005 Orders as the Court‘s basis for those Orders.
The Court will devote less attention to the Baldino document than do the parties herein. It is quite surprising that a
party would urge this Court to place any weight upon a law
clerk‘s bench memo that, by double hearsay, is said to have
been adopted by a Superior Court judge, whose order is silent
on the matter. Even if the document were characterized as
the ―basis‖ for the court‘s orders—a characterization that is
belied by the form and contents of the document, notwithstanding Mr. Paris‘ Certification—it would amount at most
to persuasive authority, ―entitled only to that weight that its
power to persuade compels.‖ Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. National Indian Gaming Com’n, 327 F.3d 1019,
1043 (10th Cir. 2003). The persuasive power of the Baldino
document is limited—it devotes a perfunctory ten lines to the
application of section 2302(c) to the IBEX warranty. The
Court thus does not rely upon that document in rendering its
decision herein.34
Finally, in a case in which several defendants sought her disqualification, Judge Shira Scheindlin, in a survey of other cases with similar circumstances, quoted a newspaper article that quoted another
judge‘s law clerk as saying: ―As soon as he was assigned the case,
[Judge Dennis Montali] immediately undertook steps to sell those

34. Id. (citations to the record omitted).
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stocks, and he sold them before any of the parties made any appearance in this case and before he made any decision in this case.‖35
B. Law Clerk Saith What?
The law-clerk exhibits discussed above are mostly documents
created during the course of litigation but not for the purpose of litigation. An affidavit, on the other hand, is a document generated
specifically for use in support of a pleading or at a hearing. Thus, a
law clerk who gives an affidavit is a giant step closer to the field of
play than a law clerk whose letter to a litigant ends up being cited in
a judicial opinion. In this section, I discuss cases in which affidavits
have been solicited from law clerks, with a focus on the subject matter of those affidavits.
I begin with the most bodacious law-clerk affidavits of all time,
the ones solicited by Judge Mitchell Cohen, from his law clerks, in
Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted.36 In that case, in order to rule on the
plaintiff‘s request for a temporary restraining order to prevent local
law-enforcement officials from closing down his entertainment establishment, Club Lido, the court was required to determine whether
―‗nude interpretive dancing‘ [is] embraced within the guarantees of
Freedom of Speech under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.‖37 After a hearing on the plaintiff‘s request, ―an
agreement was reached between the parties and the Court wherein
the Club would be allowed to open on February 4, 1974 at which
time a video tape would be made for the Court‘s review to determine
if an injunction should issue.‖38 However, ―[m]uch to the dismay of
the Court, technical developments occurred allegedly due to the jostling of the cinematographer by the throngs of curious patrons, resulting in an unsatisfactory viewing.‖39 As Judge Cohen further explained:
35. In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 70, 88 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
36. 370 F. Supp. 506, 507–08 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 493 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974) (unpublished table decision).
37. Starshock, 370 F. Supp. at 507.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The tape, lacking the artistry of a Cecil B. DeMille production, and the Court, mindful of the possible restraint employed by the entertainers with knowledge that their performance was being taped for judicial scrutiny, dispatched its
two law clerks, unannounced and unheralded, to the scene on
a fact finding mission to make a more objective and comprehensive examination of the Club‘s activities . . . . It might be
said that this mission was a far cry from the routine duties of
a judicial law clerk.40
Many other things might also be said, such as ―No Shinola, Sherlock!‖41 In any event, upon their return from the club, Judge Cohen‘s law clerks executed affidavits.42 Based on those affidavits, the
videotape, and several still photographs, the judge made rather extensive factual findings43 and, based on those findings, ruled that the
40. Id. at 507–08. Judge Cohen sent his law clerks, it seems, because ―a personal
visit [by him] . . . was not deemed feasible.‖ Id. at 507. Good call. As judicial
opinions go, Starshock has legs. The trial judge in Expo, Inc. v. City of Passaic, in
reliance on Starshock, sent the court‘s law clerks to view performances at an establishment called Top Tomato, ―as well as performances at nearby go-go shows.‖
373 A.2d 1045, 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977).
41. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 752–53 (1978) (quoting George
Carlin routine that identifies the typically brown animal waste product with which
shinola shoe polish is sometimes confused); McIsaac v. State, No. 01-90-00894CR, 1992 WL 2257, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1992) (reporting defense attorney‘s response to witness‘s answer on cross-examination: ―No [typically brown
animal waste product], Sherlock. Will you please answer my question.‖).
42. Starshock, 370 F. Supp. at 508. Whether or not they also executed cold
showers was discretely left undisclosed.
43. Id. Among the more colorful are these:
There are two girls dancing simultaneously—one in the center of
each bar. They apparently enter from an ―undressing‖ room located on
the side of the Club. As the girls walk from the room to the stage, they
are covered with sheer negligee-type garments. Upon reaching the stage,
they disrobe and stand poised waiting for the first throbbing notes to
sound. The girls ―dance‖ to four numbers, then dress and leave. They
are, of course, immediately replaced by two new girls.
The girls are completely nude as they gyrate with varying degrees of
intensity. They bump, grind and bounce to the strains of contemporary
rock music while the audience looks on sipping their one dollar soft
drinks, with expressions of deep thought, nervousness, or amusement.
While the girls carefully avoided fondling themselves or carrying on con-
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club‘s nude interpretive dancing was not protected speech.44 Consequently, he denied the plaintiff‘s request for preliminary injunctive
relief.45
The most unsurprising topic of law-clerk affidavits, and presumably the least contentious, is the realm of procedure. In Anderson v.
Keane,46 a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon turned to an affidavit from the law
clerk of a state trial judge (who had since died) in order to ascertain
why an issue concerning verdict sheets had not been raised on direct
appeal.47 The demise of a state-court judge also precipitated, at least
in part, the procurement of law-clerk affidavits in Lucas v. United
States,48 a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in
which the circumstances surrounding a previous state-court conviction were at issue:
Unfortunately, as was noted above, there is no transcript
of the state court proceeding. In addition, the Honorable
Marc Westbrook, the presiding judge in that proceeding, was
killed in a car accident in 2005. As such, the court must rely
versations with the patrons, the movements of their generously endowed
torsos left absolutely nothing to the imagination. Indeed, those persons
sitting at the bar were able to distinguish the quarter-inch letters of a tattoo located on the derriere of one young lady which identified her as
―Property of the Dragon‘s Motorcycle Gang.‖
Id. at 508.
44. Id. He then elaborated:
It is determined that the performances offered at the Club Lido fall
far short of presenting an issue of ―speech‖ sufficiently important to outweigh the State of New Jersey‘s interest in curtailing nudity in public
places. In no way can the movements of the ―Ladies of the Ensemble‖
performed in unabashed nudity be considered an art form containing the
slightest iota of ―self-expression.‖ ―Swan Lake‖, it was not! Although
advertised as ―Nude Interpretive Dancing‖, it was neither interpretive or
dancing–just nude, a ―Go-go‖ performance bereft of outer dress. What
we have here is the cheap exploitation of human sexuality for purely
commercial purposes.
Id. at 509.
45. Id. at 510.
46. 283 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
47. Id. at 943.
48. Cr. No. 3:05-076-0-MBS, 2010 WL 412554 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2010).
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on other evidence to determine whether Movant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel prior to pleading
guilty in his state court proceeding . . . .
The government also produced evidence from two of
Judge Westbrook‘s former law clerks. The affidavit of Alan
M. Wilson (―Wilson‖) indicates that ―it was Judge
Westbrook‘s habit and routine practice to advise [ ] pro se
defendants of their right to counsel, including the right to appointed counsel if they could not afford an attorney, as well
as to make a finding that their waiver of counsel was voluntarily and intelligently made prior to accepting a guilty plea.‖
In Wilson‘s opinion, Judge Westbrook ―would never have
accepted a guilty plea without first having found on the
record that the decision to plead guilty was freely, voluntarily
and intelligently made.‖ The deposition of Judge Brian W.
Jeffcoat, another former clerk of Judge Westbrook, indicated
that Judge Jeffcoat never saw Judge Westbrook accept a
guilty plea without first making a finding on the record that
the guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made. Judge Jeffcoat further stated that Judge Westbrook took his time with
pro se defendants to make sure they understood what was
going on and did not wish to have an attorney.
Movant produced the affidavit of Coconut Pantsari, who
was the court reporter for Judge Westbrook the day Movant
was sentenced. Ms. Pantsari had no memory of Movant‘s
guilty plea, but indicated that Judge Westbrook took pleas rather rapidly and that any warnings regarding the dangers of
proceeding without an attorney given to Movant ―would have
been perfunctory.‖
Based upon the foregoing evidence and looking at the
record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant knowingly
and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the underlying
state court proceeding.49

49. Id. at *3–4 (citations to the record omitted).
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The circumstances surrounding the entry of a default in a statecourt case were at issue in Sterling Factors, Inc. v. Whelan,50 in
which U.S. District Judge Owen Forrester was faced with dueling
affidavits from the law clerk and the attorneys involved in the statecourt proceeding.51 In Merit Finance Co. of Kingsport v. Service
Finance Co. of Greenwood,52 Judge Robert Hemphill both cited and
appended in full an affidavit from his law clerk to demonstrate that
the defendants had been notified of a hearing on the plaintiff‘s motion for a default judgment.53 In Lehman v. United States,54 the
―plaintiff and her counsel . . . filed affidavits averring that they were
informed by the trial Judge‘s law clerk . . . that [the] plaintiff could
remain at home . . . until she received a telephone communication
from her counsel to come to Philadelphia for the trial.‖55 Judge
Charles Kraft was not persuaded: ―This allegation is expressly contradicted by the averments of an affidavit, filed by the law clerk [at]
the Court‘s direction.‖56
The law-clerk affidavit in Yagman v. Republic Insurance57 was
also judicially solicited.58 There, Judge William Keller sanctioned
an attorney under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
18 U.S.C. § 401, and the court‘s inherent power59 for, among other
―pestiferous conduct,‖60 disobeying an order that he had issued.61 In
support of his determination that the attorney understood his order,
Judge Keller wrote: ―Yagman ignores the issue posited by the Court
that any ambiguity with respect to the Court‘s request for copies of
50. 245 B.R. 698, 701 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
51. Id. at 702.
52. 38 F.R.D. 482 (D.S.C. 1965).
53. Id. at 483, 485; see also N‘Jai v. Floyd, Civil Case No. 07-1506, 2009 WL
1531594, at *11 & n.26 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2009) (citing affidavits from judge‘s
courtroom deputy clerk and former law clerk as well as the court‘s data quality
analyst, Unix/Linux systems administrator, and webmaster/trainer to demonstrate
that court had ―heard nothing further from Plaintiff in the next 30 days‖).
54. 313 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
55. Id. at 250.
56. Id. at 250 n.1.
57. 137 F.R.D. 310 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
58. Id. at 311.
59. Id. at 311–12.
60. Id. at 318.
61. Id. at 317.
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the papers in Manuel L. Real, Chief Judge, United States District
Court for Central District of California v. Stephen Yagman was clarified telephonically by my law clerk.‖62 Judge Keller cited the declaration of his law clerk,63 which he appended in full,64 and then, for
good measure, he explained that ―[i]t is appropriate for a court to
consider the conduct of the Judge‘s law clerk.‖65 In the end, the
sanctions did not stick. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the order
by Judge Keller that attorney Yagman supposedly disobeyed ―specifically requested a complaint and pleadings which did not exist.‖66
The court of appeals then explained: ―It was objectively impossible
for Yagman to comply with the terms of the written order. Though
the court‘s law clerk may have requested other documents, this request was not part of the court‘s order and therefore cannot serve as
the basis for a finding of contempt.‖67 On that basis, the Ninth Circuit held that the imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion.68

62. Id. at 315.
63. Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at 315 n.4.
64. Id. at 319–20.
65. Id. at 315 n.4 (citing Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc‘ns Enters., Inc.,
498 U.S. 533, 545–46 (1991)).
66. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id. Attorney Yagman continued to tangle with Judge Keller. Shortly after
Judge Keller sanctioned him, ―Yagman was quoted as saying that Judge Keller
‗has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David Kenner and Hugh
Manes. I find this to be evidence of anti-semitism.‘‖ Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Yagman was found to have
told a reporter ―that Judge Keller was ‗drunk on the bench.‘‖ Id. Regarding the
―drunk on the bench‖ comment:
The primary evidence . . . consist[ed] of testimony from one of Judge
Keller‘s former law clerks. The law clerk testified that a reporter called
the chambers seeking comment on Yagman‘s ―drunk on the bench‖
statement. The witness did not claim he had spoken with the reporter
himself; rather, he testified that the reporter spoke to his co-clerk and that
he (the witness) happened to be in the room with the co-clerk when the
call came in. The witness did not explain how he came to know what the
reporter was saying at the remote end of the telephone line, but presumably he was testifying as to what the co-clerk said the reporter said Yagman said.
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Law clerks have also been asked to give affidavits to document
things they did, or did not do, in particular cases. For example, in
Porcaro v. United States,69 ―[t]he government filed affidavits from
both the law clerk and the courtroom clerk who said they never discussed possible sentences with petitioner or his counsel or said that
he would receive a one year sentence if he plead guilty.‖70 And in
McCulloch v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.,71 in which
the plaintiff moved for Judge Alan Nevas‘s recusal based on the
post-clerkship employment of one of his law clerks, the judge solicited an affidavit from that former law clerk that explained his involvement in the plaintiff‘s case during his post-clerkship employment.72
Among the more interesting law-clerk affidavits are those in
which law clerks have provided testimony concerning the conduct of
Id. at 1441 n.20 (citation omitted). For the conduct described above, as well as
other intemperate remarks about Judge Keller, and after a hearing at which Judge
Keller‘s former law clerk testified, the Standing Committee on Discipline for the
Central District of California suspended Yagman from practice in the district. Id.
at 1433. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1445. Yagman 2, Judge Keller 0.
69. 832 F.2d 208 (1st Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 213.
71. No. 3:01CV1115(AHN), 2005 WL 3144656 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2005).
72. Id. at *2. In McCulloch, the plaintiff‘s attorney claimed that ―the Court‘s
new law clerk told him that the law clerk who was working on the case had left
and had taken the court file with him so that he could finish the pending motions.‖
Id. at *1. According to the former law clerk‘s affidavit:
At the time his clerkship ended on September 1, 2005, his work on this
case was substantially finished. He did not take the court file with him
when he left. He commenced his employment with the Firm on September 6, 2005. After he started working at the Firm he had no substantive
discussions about this case with the Court and did not discuss the merits
of the pending motions with the Court. His work consisted of finishing
up the drafts, primarily editing and doing some minor research. He submitted his drafts to the Court sometime during the last week of September
2005.
Id. at *2. Judge Nevas added: ―The drafts he submitted were revised, edited, and
reviewed by the Court before they were issued on September 29 and 30, 2005.‖
Id. While there is no reason to fault Judge Nevas‘s determination that recusal was
not warranted, it is not difficult to see the problems that can arise when work on
judicial opinions is conducted by those other than court employees, such as lawyers working for private firms. Note to self: Remember to complete all unfinished
work before leaving clerkship.
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their judges. In Greer v. Minnesota,73 a habeas corpus proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the petitioner
obtained and submitted affidavits from two law clerks for the
[state-court] trial judge who stated that ―the trial judge appeared ‗visibly angry at defense counsel‘ during Greer‘s trial;
that he told them he had ‗denied defense counsel‘s challenges
for cause because he was angry with them‘; and that, contrary to his common practice he had not sent jury questionnaires to the attorneys.‖74
Clearly, there were some pretty interesting goings on during and after Mr. Greer‘s trial but, sadly for students of trial advocacy and habeas practice, the Greer opinion says little more than what I have
quoted and leaves much to the imagination, including just how the
petitioner got such crucial (and critical) affidavits from the trial
judge‘s law clerks. While the Minnesota Supreme Court ―did conclude that it was ‗unlikely that the law clerks‘ affidavits would have
formed the basis for removal of Judge Crump,‘‖75 it ultimately determined that the claim supported by the law-clerk affidavits was
procedurally barred, thus preventing both it, and the federal habeas
court, from reaching that claim on the merits.76
Perhaps the most noteworthy law-clerk affidavits were those given by the law clerks of Judge Paul Riley of the Southern District of
Illinois. According to Judge Richard Mills, ―[t]he late Paul E. Riley,
United States District Judge for the Southern District of Illinois, had
a penchant for communicating ex parte with jurors in cases in which
he was the presiding judge.‖77 In at least seven cases, criminal defendants convicted after jury trials before Judge Riley moved for
73. 493 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2007).
74. Id. at 956.
75. Id. at 957 (quoting Greer v. State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. 2004)).
76. Greer, 493 F.3d at 957–58. While no court ever had to consider the affidavits given by Judge Crump‘s law clerks, Judge Crump was subjected to another
kind of wildness; he and six jurors gave testimony at a post-trial Schwartz hearing.
Id. at 955–56. (―In Minnesota courts, a Schwartz hearing is used when jury impartiality is disputed and allows for the examination of the jurors on the record in the
presence of counsel for all parties.‖ Id. at 956 n.3 (citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis
Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Minn. 1960))).
77. United States v. Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (S.D. Ill. 2002).
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new trials based in part on Judge Riley‘s ex parte communications
with jurors, and, in those cases, law-clerk affidavits were offered as
evidence of the communications at issue.
In United States v. Davis,78 Judge Riley‘s permanent law clerk,
Sheila Hunsicker, testified by affidavit that the judge excused the
defendant and counsel from the courtroom, but remained, along with
her, ―while the jurors viewed the firearms and ammunition marked
as exhibits in the case.‖79 She further testified:
[W]hile the jury was viewing the exhibits, Judge Riley
questioned whether the Defendant could have concealed all
of the weapons under his trench coat. I walked over to Judge
Riley and asked him to not talk to the jurors while they were
looking at the exhibits. He got mad, pointed toward the door,
and indicated that I should leave the courtroom. I left the
building.80
Charles Davis got a new trial.81 United States v. Von Briggs82 involved similar circumstances and the same law clerk:
Judge Riley informed Von Briggs and counsel that they
would be excused from the courtroom while the jurors
viewed the drugs and the firearms marked as exhibits in the
case but that he would remain to ensure that no one ingested
any of the narcotics and that no one was shot with one of the
firearms. According to her affidavit, Sheila Hunsicker also
remained in the courtroom while the jury viewed the evidence. Hunsicker testified that while the jury was viewing
the exhibits, she observed Judge Riley inform one of the jurors that certain markings on a gun clip (which had been admitted into evidence) were not very important or did not really matter. In addition, Hunsicker testified that she noticed
Judge Riley interacting with the jurors as they viewed the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

109 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Ill. 2000).
Id. at 993.
Id. at 996.
Id. at 997.
109 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (S.D. Ill. 2000).
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evidence and observed him making facial expressions which
she believed revealed his anti-prosecutorial sentiments.83
Like Davis, Marlenhuff Von Briggs got a new trial.84 And in United
States v. Quilling,85 Gary Quilling got a new trial based in part on
law clerk Hunsicker‘s affidavit, which corroborated a court reporter‘s affidavit testimony that ―she observed Judge Riley telling the
jurors in Quilling‘s case that ‗this is ridiculous‘ . . . [and] that Judge
Riley made derogatory remarks to the jury . . . regarding the Government‘s attorney.‖86
Judge Riley‘s other four cases that went before Judge Mills involved Judge Riley‘s other law clerk, David Agay.87 In each case,
Judge Mills wrote something like this:
During an interview by Chief Judge Gilbert, Agay informed
Chief Judge Gilbert that, during his tenure as Judge Riley‘s
law clerk, he assisted Judge Riley in only four trials: United
States v. Bradley, 98-30149, United States v. Bishawi, 9740044, United States v. Alexander, 99-30067, and United
States v. Hodges, 99-40009. Of those four trials, Agay had a
specific recollection that Judge Riley entered the jury room
and spoke with the jury while they were deliberating in three
of the four cases, although he could not specify in which of
the three cases the improper contact had occurred. Moreover, in his affidavit, Agay testified that ―[o]n some occasions,
I was not present in chambers when the jury sent a note.
Sometimes, Judge Riley would receive the note, read it, go
into the jury room, and close the door.‖88
He then added something like this:

83. Id. at 1005–06 (footnote omitted).
84. Id. at 1008.
85. 109 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (S.D. Ill. 2000).
86. Id. at 1011.
87. See United States v. Alexander, 110 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766 (S.D. Ill. 2000);
United States v. Bishawi, 109 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1001 (S.D. Ill. 2000); United States
v. Bradley, 109 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (S.D. Ill. 2000); United States v. Hodges,
110 F. Supp. 2d 768, 771 (S.D. Ill. 2000).
88. Hodges, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
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In addition, Agay testified that he ―observed Judge Riley
speaking to jurors outside the courtroom on several occasions.‖ Although Agay went on to say that the discussions
merely concerned mundane matters such as the weather, given Judge Riley‘s improprieties with juries in other cases, the
Court is concerned that even these, perhaps, innocent contacts with the juries might have had an influence on the juries‘ partiality despite Agay‘s statement that he did not see or
hear Judge Riley discuss the substances of any case during
these contacts. At a minimum, given the circumstances surrounding these seven cases and Judge Riley‘s medical condition, it leaves one with the impression that ―[s]omething is
rotten in the state of Denmark.‖89
Judge Mills granted new trials to the defendants in Hodges, Alexander, Bishawi, and Bradley,90 but, in Bishawi and Hodges, the government appealed successfully and, after evidentiary hearings on
remand, prevailed in the district court, on grounds that Ahmad Bishawi and Carlan Hodges had not been harmed by Judge Riley‘s ex
parte contacts with the juries in their trials.91
89. Id. at 772–73 n.6 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 4).
90. Alexander, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 768; Bishawi, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1004; Bradley, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 991; Hodges, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 774.
91. United States v. Bishawi, 186 F. Supp. 2d 889, 893–94 (S.D. Ill. 2002)
(―[S]everal jurors testified that Judge Riley came into the jury room and/or into the
jury‘s break room and spoke with them about the weather, about television programs, and about why the trial had been cancelled one day.‖); United States v.
Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (S.D. Ill. 2002) (―[T]he juror who testified that
Judge Riley entered the jury room during deliberations stated that Judge Riley was
only in the jury room briefly (about a minute or as long as it takes to walk into the
kitchen to get a soft drink out of the refrigerator), that Judge Riley did not say
anything or make any unusual gestures, and that, although he thought it peculiar
for Judge Riley to be in the jury room during the deliberations, Judge Riley‘s presence did not affect the verdict‖). While Judge Mills ruled in favor of the government in Bishawi and Hodges, he made no secret of his opinion of Judge Riley‘s
conduct, calling it ―inappropriate and unbecoming a judicial officer . . . [and] a
disservice to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois,
to the legal profession, and to the federal judiciary.‖ Hodges, 189 F. Supp. 2d at
861. He concluded: ―Judge Riley‘s conduct in this cause is not to be countenanced; his actions reflect adversely upon the integrity of the judicial system.‖ Id.
at 862; see also Bishawi, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 895.
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Notwithstanding the examples discussed above, there are at least
some law-clerk affidavits about judicial conduct that are not critical
of the judges they discuss. For example, in Hathcock v. Navistar
International Transportation Corp.,92 Judge Ross Anderson responded to the defendant‘s motion to recuse him for bias by soliciting an affidavit from his law clerk ―stating that the court in large
measure had adopted the factual predicate from the proposed order
drafted by the [plaintiff‘s] counsel, but had drawn independent legal
conclusions.‖93 Judge Anderson denied the motion.94 The court of
appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration,95
stating:
Though probably insufficient to merit recusal in isolation, the
judge‘s ex parte contacts requesting the Hathcocks‘ counsel
to draft at least the factual basis of a default order, and possibly its legal conclusions as well, do not foster an impression
of objectivity, particularly since Navistar was never given an
opportunity to respond to the proposed order. We are also
troubled by the judge‘s willingness to involve the court as a
participant in ongoing litigation by directing his law clerk to
file an affidavit in response to the Hathcocks‘ recusal motion.96
The law-clerk affidavit in United States v. Zichettello97 neither
criticized the law clerk‘s judge nor praised her.98 Rather, that affidavit, along with one from the judge,99 merely purported to describe
the process by which jury instructions were prepared in chambers,100
which, ultimately, the court of appeals found wanting.101 While the
92. 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995).
93. Id. at 39.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 41.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. 208 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 92.
99. Id. at 89.
100. Id. at 89–92.
101. Id. at 97–98. The court concluded: ―[W]hether we have the power to order a
change in such a practice is unclear. We review judgments, and our review of the
convictions and sentences here may not be an appropriate vehicle for the fine tun-
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court‘s description of the instruction-preparation process, including
the law clerk‘s role therein, and the court‘s appraisal of the law
clerk‘s affidavit102 are of moderate interest, at least to those who help
prepare jury instructions, the real law-clerk wildness in Zichettello
involved the way in which the issue came to light in the first place:
On April 9, after the government‘s [appellate] brief had
been filed, the government moved to ―correct the record so
that it reflects the charge given to the jury . . . .‖
Three days after the government‘s brief was filed, the
person who had served as the trial judge‘s law clerk (―Law
Clerk‖) during the trial—he had left in September 1998, after
two years of service—encountered a former Assistant United
States Attorney (―AUSA‖) who had been one of the lead
prosecutors in the case. The occasion was a social event at
Fordham Law School. The AUSA and her husband, a Fordham law professor (―Law Professor‖), depicted the ensuing
conversation as follows. The AUSA told the Law Clerk that
she did not remember the district judge giving the instructions described in Point I of the appellants‘ brief. The Law
Clerk said that he also did not remember them. The Law
Professor recalled the Law Clerk also saying he had actually
returned to the judge‘s chambers and found that the instructions in the ―script‖ read to the jury by the judge were different from those in the transcript upon which the appellants‘
brief relied. The Law Clerk recalls the conversation with the
AUSA and remembers telling her that he believed that the
charge described by appellants was correct on the law. He
does not recall mentioning a script or saying that the language in question was not in the script.
This conversation prompted the government to inquire
further into the charge issue. Days later, the government
communicated with the court reporter, Vincent Bologna, who
had transcribed the jury instructions. Bologna told the goving of this practice. However, we invite the judges of the Southern District to
consider revision.‖ Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
102. Id. at 94–97.
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ernment that the language challenged by appellants was not,
in his view, actually read to the jury. Based on this and documents provided by Bologna, the government concluded that
there was compelling evidence that the record certified to this
court was in error on an issue material to the appeal.
The AUSA contacted the attorneys who represented appellants at trial and asked them whether they remembered
hearing the challenged language during the jury charge. The
attorneys all stated in substance that they did not remember
whether the district court actually uttered the challenged
words. The government thereafter contacted appellants‘ appellate counsel to seek their consent to amend the transcript
and strike Point I of the Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer brief.
Understandably, appellate counsel did not consent to the request. Accordingly, the government filed the present motion
to amend in this court. We thereafter invited the district
judge to submit her version of events in writing. She responded with an affidavit and submitted as well an affidavit
of the Law Clerk.103
While the court of appeals had much to say about many aspects of
the trial court‘s practices and procedures, it reported, without comment, the conversation at the Fordham social event at which the former law clerk spilled a few more legumes than I would have let out
of my bean pot in a similar situation.
I conclude this section with an affidavit-assisted trip from the
frying pan straight into the fire. In Jones v. Clinton104 (yes, that
Clinton), one of the House Managers of the presidential impeachment trial contacted Judge Susan Webber Wright, who was presiding
over Paula Jones‘s suit against President Clinton, and told Judge
Wright that he was thinking about calling her as a witness in the impeachment trial.105 Judge Wright was never asked to testify,106 but
her law clerk was not so lucky: ―Later, a representative of the House
Managers requested and, with my permission, received an affidavit
103.
104.
105.
106.

Zichettello, 208 F.3d at 88–89 (citations to the record omitted).
36 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
Id. at 1124 n.11.
Id.
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concerning the President‘s deposition from my law clerk, Barry W.
Ward, who attended the President‘s deposition.‖107 Law clerks have
given a few affidavits over the years, but it will be quite a long time,
I suspect, before any law-clerk affidavit can top the one Barry Ward
gave.
C. From the Mouths of Law Clerks
The final step in the transformation from observer to participant,
from law clerk to witness, occurs when a court takes formal testimony from a law clerk. Like the previous section, this section is organized primarily on the basis of the topics on which law clerks have
been asked to testify. Those topics include, among others, issues
related to the operation of juries, other trial-related procedural matters, the imposition of sanctions on attorneys and judges, and determinations of competence.
1. Jury Issues
Law clerks have been called to testify about jury-related issues in
a variety of ways, sometimes during the course of trial by the presiding judges for whom they worked, sometimes after the fact.
United States v. Bradley108 involved the removal of a juror
named Jefferson for sleeping during trial.109 Before the sleeping
issue arose, Jefferson was moved from one spot in the jury box to
another because of ―an odor problem,‖110 and ―[l]ater the Assistant
United States Attorney told the court he thought that Jefferson was
eating paper.‖111 After another juror told the court, under oath, that
she had overheard Jefferson say that she had made up her own mind
and would not listen to the court, ―[t]he court then told the parties
that it had noticed Jefferson sleeping.‖112 Thereafter, the court

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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swore in one of its law clerks, who testified that during the
government‘s closing, she had noticed Jefferson sleeping.
The defendants had the opportunity to cross-examine the
clerk but did not do so. The court expressed its desire to
question Jefferson, but the defendants opposed that procedure.113
Subsequently, ―[t]he court . . . stated that it had observed that Jefferson had not been paying attention during the defendants‘ summation.‖114 The defendants then ―urged the court to examine Jefferson.‖115 It declined to do so and dismissed her from the jury without
questioning her.116 The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that it was
not improper for the trial court to dismiss Jefferson for sleeping
without a voir dire of her:
The court had a legitimate basis to dismiss Jefferson.
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c), a court may dismiss jurors if
they ―become or are found to be unable or disqualified to
perform their duties.‖ The defendants argue that the court‘s
stated reason for dismissing Jefferson, that she was sleeping,
was only a ―pretext,‖ and that the court and the government
had singled her out and were looking for ways to remove her.
But the record shows that the court dismissed her for inability to serve as a juror, and that the court had sufficient information to support the dismissal and so did not have to voir
dire her or the other jurors with respect to this point. See,
e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d [1384,] 1395 [(3d Cir.
1994)]; United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.
1994).
The defendants downplay the fact that the court itself noticed Jefferson sleeping: first, when it overheard someone
snoring loudly during the government‘s summation, then,
when it observed Jefferson snoring during the defendants‘
summation; thus, its dismissal was not solely based on its law
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 228–29.
Bradley, 173 F.3d at 229.
Id.
Id.
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clerk‘s observations. The court could take judicial notice of
the conduct of a juror in open court. See, e.g., United States
v. Carter, 433 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1970). Moreover, the
court did not base its decision on ex parte communications
with its clerk. Rather, it put the clerk on the stand to be
cross-examined. The defendants refused to question the
clerk, and now argue that this is because they did not want to
risk attacking the court through its extension, the clerk. Yet
the defendants‘ attorneys were quite willing to argue with the
court itself regarding its observation that Jefferson was sleeping, and were willing to question whether the court had observed other jurors sleeping as well.117
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Coyle Realty Co.,118 the issue was whether
the jury had been ―improperly coerced or subjected to undue influence.‖119 The trial court held a post-trial hearing on that issue, at
which the following transpired:
The jury foreman testified that the bailiff physically pushed
him back into the jury room, and that the jury was forced to
deliberate after it had clearly reached an impasse as if a verdict were a condition of release from ―prison.‖ The foreman‘s testimony was contradicted by several witnesses at the
post-trial hearing. The law clerk of the judge presented uncontroverted testimony that when she told the foreman that
the presiding judge would declare a mistrial and dismiss the
jury, he requested additional time for deliberation.120
In United States v. Florea,121 a law clerk was called by his or her
judge, in a hearing held on the day a criminal defendant was sentenced, to describe the manner in which certain tape recordings were
played for a jury during its deliberations.122 In Cigna Fire Under-

117. Id. at 230.
118. 838 F.2d 467 (unpublished table decision), 1988 WL 4623 (4th Cir. Jan. 14,
1988).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id.
121. 541 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 570–71.
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writers Co. v. MacDonald & Johnson, Inc.,123 Judge Douglas Woodlock took testimony from a number of people, including a law clerk
to Judge Frank Freedman, at a hearing to determine whether Judge
Freedman had had ex parte contact with the jury during a trial he had
conducted.124 Finally, in what can only be described as an extraordinary habeas corpus proceeding, Judge Charles Briant held an evidentiary hearing on the issue of racial composition of juries in New
York state-court criminal proceedings in which he heard from,
among others, ―a former law clerk to a state Supreme Court Justice
in Bronx County who testified, based on his observations of 12 to 15
voir dires from 1978 to 1980, that 60 to 75% of the jurors called
were dark skinned.‖125
The cases discussed above are all appellate opinions discussing
law-clerk testimony taken in the court below. There are, however,
several district-court opinions in which judges discuss testimony
they have taken from their own law clerks. In United States v.
Kohne,126 Judge Rabe Marsh sequestered the jury in a criminal case
and had three jury attendants ―sworn to safeguard the jury.‖127 One
of those attendants was his law clerk.128 After one juror submitted a
written statement claiming coercion by other jurors,129 and the defendants filed a motion for a new trial,130 Judge Marsh held a hearing
at which he questioned the jury attendants, including his law clerk.131
In United States v. Lopez-Martinez,132 Judge Stephen McNamee held
a post-trial evidentiary hearing on a criminal defendant‘s motion for
a new trial, at which he questioned a law clerk of his who had ―discovered a piece of paper containing legal terms and definitions‖ in

123. 86 F.3d 1260 (1st Cir. 1996).
124. Id. at 1272–73. Judge Woodlock determined that ―Judge Freedman had no
secret communication with the jury outside the presence of counsel.‖ Id. at 1273.
125. Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 219 (2d Cir. 1987).
126. 358 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
127. Id. at 1048 n.2.
128. Id. at 1048.
129. Id. at 1047.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1048.
132. No. CR 05-1145-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 604912 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2007).
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the jury room shortly after the jury had been discharged. 133 And in
Red Star Towing & Transportation Co. v. “Ming Giant,”134 Judge
Pierre Leval put his law clerk on the stand, in a post-trial hearing, to
testify about what happened immediately after the jury returned a
verdict in a case in which counsel for one party was found to have
provided the jury with information that the judge had ruled inadmissible:
My law clerk, Mr. Mark Drooks, testified as follows to
what occurred after the end of the jury deliberations: On Saturday, February 6, 1982, as soon as the jury left the courtroom, Mr. Friedman stood up and said that he wanted to remove all of his exhibits from the jury room. Mr. Leonard
suggested that the task could be postponed until the following Monday but Mr. Friedman insisted it should be done immediately. Mr. Drooks asked Mr. Bowes not to permit anyone into the jury room until it was checked. After the jurors
left the room, he entered and found PX 337B with other pla133. Id. at *1. In the process of ruling against the defendant, on grounds that ―the
record failed to establish that any deliberating juror was aware of the extrinsic
information,‖ Judge McNamee was able, rather deftly, to avoid being in the position of resolving a credibility battle between his law clerk and one of the jurors:
In reaching this finding, the Court considered the inconsistent testimony regarding the state of the extrinsic information when it was discovered by the law clerk. The law clerk testified that the sheet of paper containing the legal terms was sitting outside of the manilla envelope when it
was discovered while the Alternate testified that he never removed the
paper from [the] manilla envelope in which it was sealed. The Court
need not be concerned with determining how the envelope [became] unsealed in light of the testimony of the deliberating jurors. The Court[ ] is
only concerned with determining whether any of the jurors who deliberated in this matter were aware of the extraneous information and the affirmative testimony of the jurors resolved this question. Not a single juror recalled seeing the extraneous information before the evidentiary
hearing . . . . Therefore, in light of the testimony of the jurors who participated in the deliberations in this matter, the Court finds that a new trial
is unnecessary because not a single juror participating in the deliberations
was even aware of the extrinsic information.
Id. at *3. Lopez-Martinez clearly points out the discomfort that can ensue when a
law clerk climbs into the witness box, especially the one in his or her own judge‘s
courtroom.
134. 552 F. Supp. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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cards. He then asked me to come into the jury room before
dismissing the lawyers. He testified that after he showed me
PX 337B, I brought it into the courtroom and told the lawyers that I was surprised to find it in the jury room after I had
so clearly ruled it not in evidence . . . .
After the above described testimony, Mr. Friedman took
the stand again, in part to refute the possible inference from
Mr. Drooks‘ testimony that his impatience to enter the jury
room resulted from a desire to remove the incriminating exhibit. He stated that it was his uniform practice to secure all
exhibits as rapidly as possible after trial so as to insure their
preservation for appeal. This position was, however, significantly weakened by the testimony of Yangming counsel, Mr.
Gotimer, that on Saturday evening after the end of the trial,
Mr. Friedman did not remove the remaining exhibits. They
remained in the courtroom over the weekend, and Mr.
Friedman relied on defense counsel to pick up his exhibits for
him. Defense counsel collected all the exhibits and forwarded plaintiff‘s exhibits to Mr. Friedman under covering
letter nearly two weeks later. It appears that Mr. Friedman‘s
sense of urgency to take possession of his exhibits diminished substantially after the court‘s discovery of PX 337B.
I conclude on overwhelming evidence that, through willful misconduct of plaintiff‘s counsel, the jury was sent an exhibit that had been excluded from the evidence because of its
unsubstantiated, inaccurate and misleading nature.135
2. Procedural Matters
As intimate participants in what goes on backstage in the courthouse, law clerks are privy to all manner of information on procedural matters. When procedure is civil, all is well, and no law clerk
needs to spill his or her guts.136 But, when things have gone awry,

135. Id. at 384 (citations to the record omitted).
136. Spill your guts? Spill the beans? I suppose that on certain occasions, after
the proper dietary input, there‘s no meaningful distinction.
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law clerks have been called to testify about the ordinarily sequestered world in which they work.
In United States v. Reich,137 Perry Reich was convicted of ―forgery of a judge‘s signature, [and] of corruptly obstructing a judicial
proceeding.‖138 In support of the second charge,
Judge Mann‘s law clerk testified that the forged Order
wasted judicial resources in requiring Judge Mann to issue
an Order [disavowing the forged Order] and to communicate
to Judge Korman and the Second Circuit that the forged Order did not come from her, and to discuss the forged order at
a status conference with the parties.139
The testifying law clerk in Velazquez v. National Presto Industries140
was called to shed light on ―the terms of the ‗settlement understanding‘ that emerged from the two settlement conferences that the court
had supervised.‖141 In order to determine those terms, the court supplemented its ―own recollection of the conferences‖ by ―hear[ing]
argument from counsel, elicit[ing] sworn testimony from its own law
clerk, and consider[ing] affidavits of counsel who were present at the
conference.‖142
Also somewhat procedural, but further off the beaten track, is the
law-clerk testimony in Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association v.
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan143 in which the plaintiffs sought, among
other relief, injunctions against ―a variety of alleged unlawful acts of
violence and intimidation against the plaintiff class . . . .‖144 In that
case, one of the defendants, who was Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux
Klan in Texas, moved to disqualify the trial judge ―on the grounds of
personal bias or prejudice against the defendants.‖145 In his affidavit,

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

420 F. Supp. 2d 75 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2007).
Reich, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 77.
Id. at 84.
884 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 494.
Id.
518 F. Supp. 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1018.

2010

LAW CLERKS OUT OF CONTEXT

101

Mr. Beam, the Grand Dragon . . . assert[ed] that [the]
judge‘s impartiality has been demonstrated by instructing
her law clerk to inquire of counsel for the plaintiffs whether
they would be intimidated or in any way adversely affected
in the presentation of their case if Mr. Beam or other members of the Ku Klux Klan wore their Klan robes at court
hearings.146
In her order on the motion to disqualify, Judge Gabrielle McDonald
wrote:
At the hearing on this motion, counsel for the defendants
called as its witness, Charles K. Barber, the law clerk of
Judge McDonald who was referred to in the Affidavit of Defendant Beam. Mr. Barber testified that although he was not
the law clerk primarily assigned to the case, he had participated in a conversation in chambers with the Judge concerning the wearing of Klansmen robes by party‘s witnesses and
spectators at the scheduled hearing on the preliminary injunction. Defendant Beam had worn a Klansman robe to his initial deposition and the attorneys for plaintiffs sought a protective order in part because they contended that Mr. Beam
was wearing a gun under the robe. Mr. Barber testified that
the judge was in Biloxi, Mississippi (at a judicial meeting)
and he was responsible for remaining in contact with the attorneys to determine if additional rulings were needed by the
Court. During a telephone conversation with Judge McDonald he was advised that the judge was not aware of the
plaintiffs‘ position with respect to the wearing of Klansmen
robes and considered that it would be appropriate to hear
from them before making a final determination. On the day
in question when Mr. Barber spoke with Mr. Dees and Adamo, the United States Deputy Marshal had advised Mr. Barber that the attorneys wanted to speak with him about one of
the witnesses‘ failure to appear at a scheduled deposition.
Mr. Barber went to the deposition room in the federal building to speak with the attorneys about that situation. As he
146. Id.
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reached the floor where the depositions were being held,
counsel for the defendant was leaving, however, Mr. Barber
spoke with attorneys for the parties about the witness who
failed to appear. After this conversation, counsel for defendant left the area and it occurred to Mr. Barber as an after
thought that he might raise the question of the wearing of
Klansmen robes in the courtroom. Mr. Barber raised this issue with counsel for the plaintiffs. Before counsel for the
plaintiffs responded, he summoned counsel for the defendants. The matter was then discussed with all counsel
present. Mr. Barber testified that Judge McDonald did not
instruct him to make an ex parte contact, but instructed him
to make the inquiry and the matter would be discussed in
greater detail with the attorneys upon her return.147
To make a long story short, Judge McDonald denied the motion to
disqualify herself.148
Vietnamese Fishermen’s Association is just one of a number of
cases in which law clerks have been called upon to provide information about communications with parties or attorneys.149 For exam147. Id. at 1018–19.
148. Id. at 1020. In another case involving a motion to disqualify a judge, Jewelry
Repair Enterprises, Inc. v. E & S Associates, Inc., Judge Herbert Hutton‘s law
clerk and courtroom deputy both testified about a communication between the
courtroom deputy and counsel for one of the parties. No. CIV. A. 95-7300, 1996
WL 311462, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1996). While Judge McDonald, in Vietnamese Fishermen’s Ass’n, and Judge Hutton, in Jewelry Repair, both admitted
the testimony of their law clerks, Judge Bernard Snyder of the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia, one of the defendants in Lipson v. Snyder took a different
approach. CIV. A. No. 85-1118, 1989 WL 79779 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 1989). In the
state-court action underlying the section 1983 conspiracy claim brought by Herbert Lipson, Judge Snyder conducted a recusal hearing at which he ―refused to
admit the testimony of one of his former law clerks, offered on the issue of his
alleged bias and partiality.‖ Id. at *3 n.1. For that conduct, and a litany of other
malfeasance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court removed Judge Snyder from office.
Id. at *1.
149. In fact, most of the procedural matters about which law clerks have been
called to testify have involved communications between law clerks and others.
However, on several occasions law clerks have been called to testify on speedytrial issues in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Favaloro, 493 F.2d 623,
626 (2d Cir. 1974) (Moore, J., dissenting); United States v. Arnett, No. CR-F-95-
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ple, in McCormack v. Schindler (In re Orbitec Corp.),150 in a hearing
in the court below, the trial judge‘s law clerk informed the court,
albeit not under oath, that he or she had not provided misinformation
to one of the parties concerning the date on which a decision had
been rendered.151 Unlike the law clerk in McCormack, the law clerk
in United States v. Wade152 did step into the witness box, having
been called to testify in a post-trial evidentiary hearing about a telephone call he placed to defense counsel in a criminal trial.153 The
defendant‘s counsel claimed he was misled into putting his client on
the witness stand based upon the law clerk‘s alleged report ―that the
[trial] judge was not going to instruct the jury on possession, as a
lesser included offense to the main charge of possession with intent
to distribute narcotics.‖154 This is what happened at the evidentiary
hearing:
Mr. Weiner called Daniel Schneider, the judge‘s law clerk, as
a witness. Schneider was asked whether he called Mr. Weiner‘s law office leaving a message for him with his secretary
to the effect that Judge Kinneary will not charge on the lesser
included offense of possession of heroin and possession of
cocaine.
The law clerk‘s response was:

5287 OWW, 2006 WL 2796448, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2006); United States v.
Altro, 358 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). Favaloro and Altro involved the
same case, and law-clerk testimony was necessary, at least in part, because Judge
George Rosling, the original trial judge, died after he had denied the defendant‘s
motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, but before he had the opportunity to
issue findings of fact and rulings of law in support of his decision. See Altro, 358
F. Supp. at 1036. The unavailability of a judge also brought his law clerk to the
witness stand in Williams v. Horn, in which a reconstruction hearing was held in
order to determine the reasons why the judge had certified a juvenile as an adult.
No. CIV. A. 93-3334, 2000 WL 1207165, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000).
150. 520 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1975).
151. Id. at 360. The party, in turn, had relied upon the law clerk‘s alleged misinformation in an attempt to avoid the consequences of failing to file a timely notice
of appeal. Id. at 359–60.
152. 522 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1975).
153. Id. at 1271.
154. Id.
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I don‘t know what she wrote down but I don‘t believe the message I gave her was what you just said.
The law clerk was then interrogated as to his telephone
conversation with Mr. Weiner as follows:
Q. Do you recall at that time telling me that the
Court informed you to inform me that it . . . was not
going to charge on the lesser included offenses in this
particular matter?
A. No, I didn‘t tell you that.
Q. What did you tell me?
A. I told you the gist of what I remember telling
you was that the Judge‘s present thinking or his
present inclination was not to instruct on the lesser
included offense of possession. However, you should
prepare instructions regarding the lesser included offense stating your position on this point and also any
other instructions you wanted the Court to charge the
jury on.155
The law clerk testified to similar effect on cross-examination, as did
an Assistant United States Attorney who the law clerk had telephoned at the same time he telephoned defense counsel.156 Accord155. Id.
156. Id. at 1271–72. While an Assistant United States Attorney did take the stand
in Wade, the judge‘s refusal to permit the defendant to call the prosecutor to the
stand was at issue in United States v. Robles, 5 F.3d 543 (unpublished table decision), 1993 WL 379831 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1993). The court of appeals described
the defendant/appellant‘s argument:
Next, appellant claims error in the trial court‘s refusal to permit him
to call as a witness Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Rooney, the
prosecutor in the instant trial, who allegedly made statements casting
doubt on the veracity of Government witness Alma Fuentes who also testified during the initial trial. The testimony at issue stems from conversations allegedly occurring between Rooney and the court‘s Law Clerk,
Christine Nelson, wherein Rooney allegedly acknowledged that Fuentes
did not tell the truth in her trial testimony. Ms. Nelson testified at a hearing during the initial trial that ―Mr. Rooney said to me that Alma Fuentes
had not been truthful on the stand.‖ While conceding that there was some
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ing to the appellate court, the judge conducting the post-trial hearing
―credited the testimony of the law clerk and the Assistant United
States Attorney, rather than the testimony of [defense counsel] Mr.
Weiner, as he was privileged to do.‖157 In other words, defense
counsel was unable to pin the tail on the law clerk. Whether Mr.
Weiner‘s client was ever able to pin the tail on his attorney, by
means of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, is a tale for
another donkey to tell.
Remaining within the realm of criminal proceedings, U.S. District Judge John Sirica‘s law clerk once found himself in the witness
box at a sentencing hearing. As reported by the court of appeals:
A few moments later, the sentencing hearing flew off on
a revealing tangent when the trial judge read a letter submitted by the appellant. The letter, from his attorney, referred to
a visit the lawyer had made to the judge‘s law clerk. In it he
reported that in the clerk‘s opinion ‗there was only one way
to get a light sentence from Judge [Sirica] and that was to
confess that you did the robbery, to apologize four or five
times and to say that you were willing to turn over a new
leaf.‘ The trial judge then called his clerk to the witness
stand and interrogated him concerning his conversation with
the attorney. The clerk affirmed that the letter fairly reflected
the substance of his comments to the lawyer. He stated, ‗It
has always been my opinion that you view sentencing differently when someone admits guilt rather than maintaining innocence.‘ He added, however, ‗This has nothing to do with
private conversations we have had in chambers. It is from
things I have heard while sitting in that seat during sentencing hearings.‘

dispute as to whether Rooney was referring to Fuentes‘ entire testimony
or just that part concerning when she received her immunity, appellant
asserts that it is ―undisputed‖ that Rooney ―felt at least some portion of
Alma Fuentes‘ testimony was untruthful.‖ This testimony, appellant argues, would have permitted the impeachment of Alma Fuentes and constituted evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.
Id. at *4. The court of appeals did not agree. Id. at *5.
157. Wade, 522 F.2d at 1272.
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The judge himself then commented upon his reactions to
defendants found guilty by the jury who continued to assert
their innocence at allocution. He went on, ‗I hope sometime
I hear some defendant say, ‗Judge, I am sorry, I am sorry for
what I did.‘ That is what I have in mind.‘158
The defendant‘s conviction was affirmed, but the case was remanded
for resentencing.159
In United States v. Parker,160 the trial judge was faced with the
defendant‘s motion for a new trial based upon ―[a]n affidavit . . .
alleging that the affiant had observed what she said indicated that
United States marshals and a law clerk had made improper contact
with the jurors.‖161 In response, the trial judge ―interrogated the
United States marshals and his law clerk.‖162 Those interrogations
were recorded, but conducted in camera.163 In response to the defendant/appellant‘s objection that ―the defense attorney was not
present at the in camera examination of the jury foreman, law clerk
and marshal,‖164 the court of appeals ruled: ―While the better practice would have been to have the attorneys present, appellant can
show no harm or prejudice arising from the court‘s actions. At most,
the exclusion of counsel from the in camera investigation is harmless
error.‖165
I conclude this section with Shiwlochan v. Portuondo,166 a real
jaw dropper, and the kind of case that inspired me to write this article in the first place. Shiwlochan involved a habeas corpus petition
that was granted in part based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.167 Judge David Trager held an evidentiary hearing, a portion of
which he described as follows:

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id. at 279.
549 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
345 F. Supp. 2d 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
Id. at 270.
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Peter Dunne, who served as the principal law clerk to
Judge John Leahy from August, 1986 to December, 1996, also testified on behalf of respondent. His duties as law clerk
included conferencing and negotiating dispositions in all cases pending before Judge Leahy, writing all of the judge‘s decisions and drafting jury instructions. Dunne testified that
Judge Leahy became involved with disposing of a case only
after Dunne reached an agreement with the parties. He also
claimed that while Judge Leahy ordinarily did not offer a particular sentence to a defendant, the judge had a ―policy not to
take any disposition once jury selection began.‖
Although Dunne had no recollection of the facts of petitioner‘s case, he testified he made it a habit to be with the
judge during trials because ―Judge Leahy needed watching. I
needed to make sure that everything he did was right.‖168
I am hard pressed to improve on the marginal note I made when I
first discovered this case: ―Wow.‖
3. Sanctions
As front-row spectators of the rich pageant that is the American
judicial system, law clerks are well positioned to get an eyeful of the
good, the bad, and the ugly of courtroom practice.169 When the bad
gets ugly, judges are sometimes compelled to target the offending
attorney with sanctions, and, when a law clerk gets caught up in the
168. Id. at 256 (citations to the record omitted).
169. As Judge Edward Weinfeld explained in an opinion finding Attorney Stanley
Cohen guilty of criminal contempt in a trial before Judge Dudley Bonsal:
In addition to the acts or statements contained in the trial transcript, the
government, to support the charge, relied upon the testimony of one of
Judge Bonsal‘s law clerks, who was present throughout the entire trial
and who described the respondent‘s expressions, manner of speaking,
bearing and attitude with reference to each cited particular.
In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (footnotes omitted). Judge
Weinfeld elaborated: ―In noting respondent‘s manner of speech, bearing and attitude, the Court accepts the testimony of Judge Bonsal‘s clerk, and the findings of
respondent‘s manner during such incidents are based thereon.‖ Id. at 1171 n.27.
Among other things, the law clerk testified that, at one sidebar conference, ―respondent raised his voice so that the jury could hear.‖ Id. at 1171.
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crossfire, that is sometimes enough to punch his or her ticket to the
witness box.170
In Nabkey v. Hoffius,171 Judge David McKeague held a pro se litigant in contempt for violating his orders to return juror questionnaires and not to contact members of the jury or venire.172 At the
contempt hearing, Judge McKeague received testimony from, and
directly examined, several deputy clerks, a case manager, and his
law clerk.173 At a show-cause hearing in Jimenez v. Coca-Cola
Co.,174 after which Judge Roslyn Silver imposed a variety of limitations on plaintiff Joe Jimenez‘s access to the courthouse, the judge
took testimony from one of her law clerks:
Finally, a law clerk for this Court testified that he received telephone calls from Mr. Jimenez in early 2001. Mr.
Jimenez inquired about the status of his case and accused the
Court and the arbitrator handling the union matter of conspiring with his attorney and Defendant Coca-Cola. The law
clerk also testified that after the Court granted Defendant‘s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Jimenez telephoned
again in September 2001, indicating his intention to appeal
and stating that he would ―then take care of all the bad people
afterwards.‖175

170. Getting the law clerk into the witness box can be essential, at least according
to some jurists. See Ahmed v. Reiss Steamship Co. (In re Jaques), 761 F.2d 302,
309 (6th Cir. 1985) (Hillman, J., dissenting) (explaining, in dissent from affirmance of trial court‘s contempt sanctions: ―The judge‘s ‗findings‘ were based on
ex parte accounts related to her by her law clerk and the district court in Baltimore.
There can be no question she was incompetent as a witness to render such testimony.‖) (citing FED. R. EVID. 602, 605, 802). While the law clerk did not testify
at the contempt hearing, lucky spectators had the pleasure of hearing Attorney
Jaques justify a previous failure to appear by explaining to Judge Ann Aldridge
―that he ‗had the screaming itches in the crotch . . . [and] wasn‘t here because [he]
would have been scratching [his] testicles constantly if [he] had been here.‘‖ Id. at
305. As Jerry Lee Lewis might say, ―Goodness, gracious . . . .‖
171. 827 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Mich. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Nabkey v. 61st Dist.
Court, 79 F.3d 1148 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision).
172. Nabkey, 827 F. Supp. at 457.
173. Id. at 453.
174. No. 99-1631-PHX-ROS, 2001 WL 1654802, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2001).
175. Id. at *2, *4 (citation omitted).
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Now there‘s a procedural posture they don‘t train you for in law
school.
An entirely different set of circumstances, equally uncovered in
most law-school curriculua, are those that came to pass in United
States v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,176 in which the Fifth
Circuit reversed a conviction for criminal contempt based on CBS‘s
violation of ―district court orders banning the publication of sketches
of courtroom scenes.‖177 At the show-cause hearing on the contempt
citation, the prosecution called the judge‘s law clerk because the
court orders that CBS was charged with violating ―were delivered
orally in the judge‘s chambers‖ and without a court reporter
present.178 As the court of appeals explained in reversing the contempt conviction:
We are faced with the unusual setting of a judge trying a
case in which he was a principal actor in the factual issues to
be determined. Essential to the proof of the prosecution‘s
case were acts committed by the judge himself, i.e. the verbal, unrecorded orders. The judge had to determine whether
what he said was said was really said. He obviously could
not be a witness and a judge in the same proceeding. To
prove what the judge must have thought he already knew, his
secretary, his law clerk and a local reporter were called as
prosecution witnesses.
....
The recondite niceties of contempt law coupled with the
strange milieu of a judge passing on the clarity of his own
orders, which had to be substantiated largely by his own legal
staff, should make us particularly sensitive to the demands of
justice, and more particularly, to the appearance of justice.
The guarantee to the defendant of a totally fair and impartial
tribunal, and the protection of the integrity and dignity of the

176. 497 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
177. Id. at 108, 110.
178. Id. at 108.
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judicial process from any hint or appearance of bias is the
palladium of our judicial system.179
Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad180 is another case
in which the court of appeals sided with an alleged contemnor rather
than the trial judge, notwithstanding the testimony of the judge‘s law
clerk.181 In that case, Judge Kevin Duffy spent much of the trial
sparring with Attorney Joseph Smukler, an out-of-town lawyer.182
Midway through trial, the judge accused Attorney Smukler of coaching his witnesses:
[A]fter chiding Smukler for having ―poorly, if ever, prepared,‖ the court said, ―[O]thers saw you motioning to the
witnesses, the four witnesses you had [meaning the fellow
conductors] during cross-examination, indicating what the
answer should be.‖ Smukler denied this as ―absolutely untrue.‖ The judge‘s law clerk was then called as a witness and
said that Smukler motioned either in an affirmative or negative way during the cross-examinations.183
On the basis of other conduct, Judge Duffy found Attorney Smukler
in contempt184 but subsequently vacated that finding.185 However,
four days into the trial, Judge Duffy denied Attorney Smuckler‘s
late-filed motion request for admission pro hac vice.186 In the end,
the court of appeals vacated and remanded, holding that ―the trial
judge‘s attitude, his treatment of Smukler, and the abrupt change of
counsel midway through trial sufficiently prejudiced the plaintiff so
as to require a new trial.‖187
Finally, while most of the law clerks mentioned in this section
were called upon to testify about the conduct of parties or counsel
179. Id. at 109 (citing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Grizzell v.
Wainwright, 481 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1973)).
180. 81 F.3d 265, 266–67 (2d Cir. 1996).
181. Id. at 275.
182. See id. at 266–71.
183. Id. at 270.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 271.
186. Santa Maria, 81 F.3d at 274.
187. Id. at 266–67.
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who appeared before their judges, at least one law clerk has had to
testify about her own conduct at a show-cause hearing. In Eisenberg
v. University of New Mexico:188
Ms. Torres, the attorney representing the plaintiff in the
underlying case, filed a motion for [a] new trial following a
jury verdict against her client. In her motion, she alleged that
Judge Edwin L. Mechem‘s law clerk had engaged in prejudicial ex parte conduct in regard to sending requested exhibits
to the jury during deliberations. Ms. Torres attached her own
affidavit to the motion, further alleging that during jury instruction discussions between respective counsel and the law
clerk in the judge‘s conference room, this same law clerk indicated that she was being represented by a member of defense counsel‘s law firm. The motion for new trial was denied, and no appeal was taken. Judge Mechem subsequently
issued an order to show cause as to why Ms. Torres should
not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for failure to conduct an
adequate inquiry into the truth and accuracy of her statement
regarding the law clerk‘s involvement with defense counsel‘s
law firm. After issuing the order, Judge Mechem recused
himself from the show cause proceedings, and Judge James
Parker was assigned to hear the case.189
Attorney Torres subsequently filed a second affidavit in which she
―further alleged that during a court recess, the law clerk had made a
second remark to the effect that she was being represented by a
member of defense counsel‘s law firm.‖190 At the show-cause hearing, ―Judge Parker heard testimony from Ms. Torres, the law clerk,
both defense counsel, the court reporter, and Ms. Torres‘s attorney.‖191 Finding that the remarks Ms. Torres attributed to the law
clerk had not been made, Judge Parker imposed Rule 11 sanctions on

188.
189.
190.
191.

936 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1132–33.
Id. at 1133.
Id.
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Ms. Torres.192 The court of appeals, while not completely on board
with Judge Parker‘s decision, affirmed.193
Then there is the one that got away, an imposition of sanctions
that was reversed on appeal largely because the law clerk of the
judge who imposed the sanctions did not testify. In LaSalle National Bank v. First Connecticut Holding Group, L.L.C. XXIII,194 Judge
Faith Hochberg sanctioned two attorneys, under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
for misrepresentations allegedly made to the judge‘s law clerk in two
telephone conversations that had the effect of unreasonably multiplying the proceedings.195 The rub was that while the attorneys testified
about what they told the law clerk, the law clerk did not testify.196
More specifically:
The law clerk‘s version of events . . . was never placed on the
record, and Rosen‘s counsel was not able to cross examine
her regarding any inconsistencies with Rosen‘s account, or
explore whether differing recollections merely resulted from
an innocent misunderstanding. Consequently, the only sworn
testimony regarding the communications between the law
clerk and Rosen came from Rosen. Nevertheless, the court
rejected Rosen‘s testimony outright. The court did so by taking ―judicial notice‖ that Rosen had used the term ―defense
counsel‖ rather than ―borrower‘s counsel‖ in his communications with the law clerk.197
The court of appeals took issue with trial court‘s fact finding:
The court took judicial notice of those two conversations
even though the court did not hear any part of the disputed
conversations and had no way of knowing what was said
other than asking the law clerk; the only participant other
than Rosen. We must, therefore, conclude that the judge‘s
certainty as to the substance of Rosen‘s communications with
her chambers was based on private discussions she had with
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1137.
287 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 288, 292.
Id. at 287.
Id.
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her law clerk—discussions that neither Rosen nor his attorney were privy to or informed of.
There is absolutely no way that the contents of Rosen‘s
disputed conversations with the judge‘s law clerk even remotely satisfies the requirements for judicial notice in [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 201(b). The contents of those conversations are certainly not a matter of common knowledge,
nor are they easily provable from a source whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned. See[,] e.g.[,] Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (taking judicial notice
of the contents of properly authenticated public disclosure
documents filed with the SEC); Policemen’s Benevolent
Ass’n v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir.
1988) (taking judicial notice of Township‘s police force
regulations); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 528
F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1976) (upholding judicial notice of defendant‘s prior conviction).
We certainly understand that a judge would be most reluctant to allow his/her law clerk to be called to the witness
stand and questioned under oath under the circumstances
here. Moreover, we are not unsympathetic to the dilemma
this created for the judge. However, that dilemma does not
justify short circuiting the fact finding process by a mantralike reliance on ―judicial notice.‖ This is especially true in
light of the severe consequences that flowed from the court‘s
resolution of the factual dispute about the conversations with
the law clerk. The court‘s conclusion regarding those conversations was a key factor in finding bad faith. Yet, Rosen
was not able to confront the only witness who could possibly
corroborate or dispute his version of the conversations.
Thus, not only was the court‘s resort to ―judicial notice‖ improper, it also denied Rosen ―a meaningful opportunity to be
heard.‖ Fellheimer v. Charter Tech., 57 F.3d 1215, 1227 (3d
Cir. 1995).198

198. Id. at 290–91 (footnote omitted).
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So, while law clerks are often regarded as their judges‘ right
hands,199 law clerks and judges appear not to be conjoined in such a
way that a law clerk‘s knowledge is properly subject to judicial notice. The court of appeals did recognize that the attorneys who were
sanctioned could have called the law clerk themselves but also noted
the problems posed by such an approach:
Of course, Marshall could have called the law clerk to the
stand on behalf of Rosen at the Show Cause hearing. However, we also recognize that an attorney would be reluctant
(to say the least) to call a law clerk to the witness stand to
testify before the very judge the clerk was clerking for under
circumstances that might require a fairly aggressive cross examination in front of the ―clerk‘s judge.‖ Under these circumstances, it is hardly appropriate, practical, or fair to require the ―opposing‖ party to call a judge‘s law clerk to the
witness stand.200
Attorneys are not the only courtroom denizens who are subject to
sanctions. Judges, too, have standards to which they must adhere,
and, when they fail to do so, or appear to fail, law-clerk testimony
sometimes follows. For example, in United States v. Campbell,201
Judge Robert Campbell of the District of Columbia Superior Court
was convicted of bribery, and Judge Campbell‘s law clerk testified,
presumably for the defense, that he or she had never seen the judge
in the presence of one of the other defendants from whom the judge
had been accused of taking bribes.202 In another case involving judi-

199. See, e.g., Dedication Ceremony for the Conrad B. Duberstein Bankruptcy
Courthouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (―[W]here would I have
been without . . . my other right-hand-man, my law clerk, David Capucilli.‖); Alex
S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 373, 391 n. 89 (1991) (―Unlike law clerks, who have special relationships with individual judges, ordinarily acting as a ‗right-hand person‘ for the
judge—vigorously debating issues with the judge and helping the judge write opinions—central staff attorneys have more institutional responsibilities.‖) (citation
omitted).
200. Id. at 291 n.7.
201. 702 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
202. Id. at 287.
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cial misconduct,203 the Eleventh Circuit denied motions to quash
subpoenas served on, among others, current and former law clerks of
Judge Alcee Hastings.204
4. Litigant Competency
Law clerks have also been called to testify about the competence
of the parties appearing before their judges. In United States v. Tesfa,205 Judge William Ditter described such a situation, in the context
of a criminal defendant‘s challenge to his conviction based on,
among other things, a claim that ―he was denied due process because
the court improperly found that he was competent to stand trial.‖206
In the words of Judge Ditter:
On November 22, 1974, the day after the jury returned a
verdict of guilty, the court commenced a posttrial competency hearing. At the outset, I stated for the record certain observations regarding the defendant‘s behavior of which I had
made notes throughout the course of the trial. I thereupon
called to the witness stand, in succession, one of my law
clerks and my courtroom deputy, who had, at my instruction
recorded their observations of the defendant‘s conduct in the
courtroom both when court was and was not in session. The

203. See Williams v. Mercer (In re Certain Complaints), 783 F.2d 1488, 1491
(11th Cir. 1986). The charges against Judge Alcee Hastings included allegations
that he
had allowed ex parte contacts between his law clerk and counsel in pending cases concerning substantive issues in those cases and concerning the
content of orders and opinions not yet entered, and had ―completely abdicated and delegated‖ his judicial decision-making authority to his law
clerk.
Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 96 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
204. Williams, 783 F.2d at 1524.
205. 404 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Green,
544 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1976).
206. Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. at 1260.
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three of us made ourselves available for questioning by both
defense counsel and the assistant United States attorney.207
In United States v. Green,208 the Tesfa appeal, the court of appeals
described Judge Ditter‘s hearing in somewhat more detail:
At intervals, throughout the course of the trial, it was reported to the court that the defendant was not communicating
with defense counsel or assisting in the presentation of his
defense. However, it was also reported to the court that
when out of the view of the prosecutor, his counsel, the jury
and the trial judge, the defendant‘s behavior was substantially different from the appearances of mental impairment he
gave in the presence of the above-listed persons. On November 22, 1974, at a post-trial competency hearing, the trial
judge revealed that from October 30 he had maintained careful notes of the defendant‘s behavior in the court room and
had directed his law clerks to observe and record the defendant‘s actions when the defendant was outside of his observation. Each law clerk testified to observations consistent
with an affected pose of mental impairment at times, including staring into space, looking at his fingers, holding them up
and moving them around, laughing at inappropriate times,
staring at people, etc. However, when the above-listed persons were not present, ―Mr. Tesfa perked up and went to talk
to his mother and talked to the marshals, got a cigarette from
them and acted in a rather normal manner, seemed to easily
communicate with them . . . and when the attorneys and Your
Honor came back in he resumed his staring during the jury

207. Id. at 1264 (footnote omitted). After describing the hearing, Judge Ditter
took pains to distinguish his case from Starshock, Inc. v. Shusted, 493 F.2d 1401
(3d Cir. 1974) (unpublished table decision), in which the court of appeals
held that supplementation of the record before a district court by affidavits of the trial judge‘s law clerks constituted error where that fact was
not disclosed to counsel for the losing party and the court handed down
its opinion before counsel had an opportunity to see the affidavits or
cross-examine the affiants.
Tesfa, 404 F. Supp. at 1264 n.5.
208. 544 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1976).
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selection.‖ Also, the defendant appeared to pay close attention to the expert testimony presented by both sides.209
The court of appeals endorsed Judge Ditter‘s approach, noting that
―[w]e have concluded that under the circumstances of the present
case, it was not reversible error for the trial judge . . . to instruct his
law clerks to monitor the defendant‘s behavior‖210 and explaining
that ―we think that the trial judge‘s actions in recording the defendant‘s actions and instructing his law clerks to do so comports with
[the] standards outlined in United States v. Liddy.‖211
5. Future Dangerousness
United States v. Johnson212 also involved law-clerk testimony
about a defendant‘s out-of-court demeanor, but in a slightly different
context.213 In Johnson, Judge Mark Bennett allowed his former law
clerk to testify during the penalty phase of Angela Johnson‘s murder
trial.214 In a motion for post-judgment relief, Johnson argued
that the court erred in allowing its former law clerk to testify
to statements she purportedly overheard Johnson make in the
law clerk‘s presence when the court itself was a witness to
Johnson‘s subsequent letter of apology that had been misplaced or lost and where the court‘s remedy denied Johnson
the opportunity to take the sting out of the evidence and
created a false impression for the jury.215
Johnson made the statement at issue in the hallway outside the courtroom in which Judge Bennett had sentenced another defendant.216
In the presence of Judge Bennett‘s law clerk, Johnson made comments that the law clerk believed to contain threats against the
209. Id. at 143–44 (footnotes and citations omitted).
210. Id. at 146.
211. Id. (citing United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
212. 403 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Iowa 2005), aff’d and remanded, 495 F.3d 951
(8th Cir. 2007).
213. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 852–53.
214. Id. at 852.
215. Id. at 852–53.
216. Id. at 853.
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judge.217 Judge Bennett allowed his law clerk to testify about those
comments at the penalty phase of Johnson‘s trial, with two limitations: ―the court did not allow the government to elicit or allow the
former clerk to testify that she was a ‗law clerk‘ under the undersigned‘s direct supervision,‖218 and ―to avoid potential prejudice, the
court barred the government from eliciting testimony that the former
clerk believed that Johnson‘s threats had been directed at the undersigned.‖219 In response to Johnson‘s motion for post-judgment relief, Judge Bennett ruled ―that the testimony of the former clerk, as
limited, was relevant to the issue of Johnson‘s future dangerousness,
because it related to threats by Johnson to law enforcement officers
and government officials.‖220 The testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, Judge Bennett ruled, because of the two limitations he
placed on it, precluding the former clerk from indicating her close
employment relationship with him and from giving her opinion of
the character of Johnson‘s comments.221 Accordingly, Judge Bennett denied Johnson‘s request for relief as it related to the admission
of the former law clerk‘s testimony.222
III. LAW-CLERK LITIGANTS
In Part II, I discussed cases in which law clerks have made the
move from the law clerk‘s desk to the witness box. This Part is devoted to cases in which law clerks have made a similarly short but
significant trip, from chambers to the courthouse intake window.
That is, I discuss law-clerk litigants.
Before doing so, I offer two caveats. First, because this article is
targeted toward the ―clerkigentsia,‖223 I have chosen to exclude cases
in which a litigant‘s status as a law clerk is mentioned, but his or her
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
220. Id. at 854 (citing Moore v. Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2000)).
221. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 854.
222. Id.
223. See Potter, Law Clerks Gone Wild, supra note 1, at 175 n.7 (―The clerkigentsia consists of former law clerks, current law clerks, and those aspiring to be law
clerks.‖).
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duties as a law clerk are tangential to the issue being litigated.224
Second, my discussion is limited to law clerks as plaintiffs; while
dozens and dozens of law clerks have been named as defendants on
account of actions they took as law clerks, they tend to remain defendants relatively briefly, owing to the extension of the doctrine of
judicial immunity to law clerks,225 which allows a law clerk named
as a defendant to move quite speedily from ―OMG‖ to ―LOL.‖
Of course, judicial immunity for law clerks goes only so far. It
does not provide protection for conduct outside the friendly confines
224. See, e.g., United States v. Schay, 746 F. Supp. 877, 877 (E.D. Ark. 1990),
rev’d sub nom. White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776 (8th Cir. 1992) (in which the United
States sued landlord under Fair Housing Act for refusing to rent house to black
lawyer who was serving as law clerk to federal judge); Doe v. United Servs. Life
Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing plaintiff suing life
insurance company to vindicate the rights of homosexuals to do so under a pseudonym, but rejecting plaintiff‘s argument that anonymity was necessary because of
―the effect [the] case might have on his status as a law clerk to a federal judge‖);
Black v. Sullivan, 561 F. Supp. 1050, 1072 (D. Me. 1983) (noting that application
for law-clerk position in Maine established domiciliary intent necessary to qualify
as state resident for purposes of qualifying for in-state tuition rate); Dobson v.
Camden, 502 F. Supp. 679, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (referring to suit brought by law
clerks charging City of Houston, and others, with race and sex discrimination);
Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass‘n, 620 P.2d 640, 646 (Alaska 1980) (holding that state
rule barring law clerk in Texas from taking Alaska bar exam until she had resided
in Alaska for thirty days violated privileges and immunities clause of federal constitution).
225. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365 (2d Cir. 2009) (―In addition,
Muldoon is entitled to absolute immunity as a law clerk to a state court judge because he was acting in a judicial capacity.‖) (citing Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37,
40 (2d Cir. 1988)); cf. Reddy v. O‘Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 132 (D.D.C.
2007) (explaining that principles of ―supervisory responsibility‖ precluded district
court from issuing orders compelling Supreme Court law clerks to take particular
actions) (citing Marin v. Suter (In re Marin), 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
Even though the law clerk in Fixel v. United States enjoyed immunity, Judge
Howard McKibben addressed the merits of Dennis Fixel‘s complaint anyway,
which allowed him to characterize Fixel‘s claims against a pro se law clerk as
frivolous as a matter of law. 737 F. Supp. 593, 595, 598 (D. Nev. 1990). And, in
DeFerro v. Coco, Judge Marvin Katz recognized that Judge Nicholas Cipriani‘s
law clerk, Dennis O‘Connell, was ―entitled to absolute immunity under the quasijudicial immunity doctrine‖ but based his decision on O‘Connell‘s ―uncontroverted affidavit, [in which he testified that] he acted pursuant to Judge Cipriani‘s
directive and instructions.‖ 719 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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of chambers.226 Nor does judicial immunity outlive the term of a
clerkship. In an opinion in a criminal case, Judge Richard Clifton
began with what must be the most mortifying words ever written
about a former law clerk: ―This case presents the disappointing story
of a promising federal appellate law clerk gone bad.‖227 According
to Judge Clifton, ―Robert Gordon, a graduate of Stanford Law
School and a former law clerk for one of our colleagues, a judge on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, embezzled millions of dollars in cash and stock from his employer, Cisco Systems.‖228 In United States v. Jefferson,229 Judge Thomas Ellis described defendant William Jefferson in the following way:
Defendant is the currently sitting member of the United
States House of Representatives representing Louisiana‘s 2nd
Congressional District, an office he has held since 1991. He
is a graduate of Harvard Law School and a former law clerk
for the late United States District Judge Alvin B. Rubin.
Prior to his election to Congress he was a member of the
Louisiana state senate, and following his election to Congress
he earned a graduate law degree in tax law from the Georgetown University Law Center.230
Jefferson was convicted of eleven of the sixteen counts in the indictment against him.231 The former law clerk in In re Violation of
Rule 50232 did not go nearly as bad as Robert Gordon or William
Jefferson, but, nonetheless, he was given a ―strong admonishment‖
by the Federal Circuit after he prepared and filed a brief in a case
that was pending before that court during his tenure as a law clerk
226. See, e.g., United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting
defendant was charged with evading taxes on, among other things, income earned
by from ―a part-time job as a law clerk to a Philadelphia judge‖).
227. United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2004).
228. Id. at 1048.
229. 562 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (U.S. 2009).
230. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
231. See Richard Simon, Congressman Who Had Cash in Freezer Is Convicted of
11
Criminal
Counts,
L.A.
TIMES,
Aug.
6,
2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/06/nation/na-jefferson6.
232. 78 F.3d 574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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there.233 Whether it is due to the prescience of judges who hire law
clerks, or the moral clarity of those who serve as law clerks, the lawclerk field appears to have been infested by only a very few bad
seeds; Gordon, Jefferson, and Violation of Rule 50 are the only cases
of their kind I was able to find.234
Turning then, from law clerks in the cross-hairs, as defendants,
to law clerks driving the litigation train, as plaintiffs, I examine three
categories of cases: those in which law clerks have litigated in an
attempt to make something good happen, those in which they have
litigated in an attempt to keep something bad from happening, and
those in which they have sought to recover after something bad has
already happened to them.
In Metsch v. United States,235 Lawrence Metsch became a hero to
law clerks everywhere when he sued for, and won, a retroactive sala233. Id. at 576.
234. There may be a fourth law clerk gone bad in Henderson v. Johnson, but I
cannot be sure. In that case, an inmate incarcerated on state criminal charges, and
who was seeking a writ of habeas corpus, ―allege[d] that [Joseph] Goodson, a
fellow inmate who represented that he was a lawyer and a former law clerk to a
United States District Judge, assisted him in preparing and filing his petition.‖ 1
F. Supp. 2d 650, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The opinion does not indicate whether
Goodson really was a former law clerk, but it does establish that Goodson malpracticed his ―client,‖ Henderson:
Henderson contends that Goodson agreed to prepare the petition and informed him that he filed it on August 26, 1996. When Henderson became concerned that he had not received any pleadings in his case, he
talked with Goodson, who urged him not to contact the court because of
the sensitive nature of the proceedings and the potential that he would
―screw everything up.‖ Henderson finally wrote to the court clerk on July 23, 1997, almost 11 months after Goodson had supposedly filed the petition. When the clerk informed Henderson that no petition had been
filed, he confronted Goodson, who denied that he had not filed the petition and produced a copy of a petition that appeared to bear a legitimate
file stamp from this court. Henderson in turn asked the clerk‘s office
whether a mistake had occurred, and learned that the seal was not the district clerk‘s and that no petition had been filed. Henderson concluded that
Goodson had created the stamp to hide the truth.
Id. So, while Goodson may or may not have been a law clerk gone bad, he was
most certainly a bad law clerk. Sadly for Henderson, the court ruled that Goodson‘s malpractice did not constitute an ―extraordinary circumstance‖ sufficient to
excuse the late filing of Henderson‘s habeas petition. Id.
235. 381 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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ry increase.236 Factually, Metsch‘s boss, United States Circuit Judge
Bryan Simpson, attempted to promote Metsch from the position of
―Associate Law Clerk‖ to that of ―Senior Law Clerk,‖ but the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts rejected
Judge Simpson‘s request to reclassify Metsch, citing a wage and
price freeze mandated by an Executive Order.237 In the district
court, Judge William Mehrtens ruled that the Administrative Office
misapplied the Executive Order and granted summary judgment to
Metsch.238
In contrast with Metsch, who successfully sued to bring about a
happy ending, Antonio Mareno, the law-clerk plaintiff in Mareno v.
Re239 brought suit in an attempt to avoid the consequences of a very
unhappy ending, his judge‘s death.240 Mareno worked for Judge
Scovel Richardson of the United States Customs Court for more than
twenty years, up until the judge died.241 Shortly after Judge Richardson‘s passing, Chief Judge Edward Re informed Mareno that his
employment would terminate on the six-month anniversary of Judge
Richardson‘s death.242 Mareno sued Chief Judge Re, asserting constitutional liberty and property interests in his continued employment.243 District Judge Charles Haight was not persuaded, ruling
that the language of the statute governing the employment of law
clerks was ―inimical to the concept of a property interest in employment by the court.‖244 The plaintiff law clerk in Silvestri v. Barbie-

236. Id. at 487.
237. Id. at 485–86. In fact, the Director rejected Judge Simpson‘s request to reclassify Metsch, ―along with fifty-one other requests for promotions or reclassifications within the category of ‗law clerk‘ and ‗secretary‘ during the period of the
[wage] freeze.‖ Id. at 485.
238. Id. at 487.
239. 568 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983).
240. Mareno, 568 F. Supp. at 17.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 20.
243. Id. at 17.
244. Id. at 20; see also Potter v. Mosley, 211 F.3d 1274, 1274 (9th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision) (ruling that a state-court law clerk ―was an at-will
employee and, therefore . . . had no constitutionally protected interest in keeping
his job‖ and ―had no constitutionally protected right to obtain a new appointment a
number of months after he had been terminated‖).
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ri245 was equally unsuccessful in his efforts to enjoin his termination.246 In Silvestri, a state-court law clerk ―became a candidate for
the office of School Director in a school district in Allegheny County and received the nominations of both parties.‖247 Subsequently,
he was notified of directives sent by the defendant Alexander
F. Barbieri, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, to the
Judges and Justices-of-the-Peace in Pennsylvania calling
their attention to the regulations of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which prohibit employees of the Judiciary in
the State of Pennsylvania from engaging in political activities
[and then he] was threatened with discharge unless he withdrew from the candidacy for office.248
Rather than withdrawing, Silvestri filed suit in federal court seeking
―injunctive relief against his threatened discharge.‖249 As it turns
out, he sought similar relief in the state courts of Pennsylvania nearly
simultaneously, and, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
against him while his federal-court action was pending, the federal
court concluded its consideration by denying relief on grounds of res
judicata and abstention.250 The school district‘s gain was the Court
of Common Pleas‘ loss.
The plaintiff in Sheppard v. Beerman251 was not a law clerk, but,
rather, a former law clerk.252 Specifically, ―Brian Sheppard served
as a law clerk to New York State Supreme Court Justice Leon Beerman from 1986 until he was fired on December 11, 1990.‖253 The
facts of the case are remarkable:
[O]n December 6, 1990, Sheppard and Judge Beerman had
conferred on the Judge‘s contemplated action on a speedy
trial motion in People v. Mason & Williams, a pending mur245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

434 F. Supp. 1200 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
317 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Sheppard III].
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
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der case. Judge Beerman asked Sheppard to draft a decision
that would set the case for trial after the coming Christmas
holiday season. Sheppard, however, believed that such a disposition would be unfairly prejudicial to Williams and not
based on the merits. Sheppard felt that Judge Beerman, under pressure from the prosecution, was railroading Williams.
Sheppard stated at his deposition that the prosecutor was upset about the lenient sentence Williams previously had received in a related drug case, and the negative publicity generated thereby. Sheppard also believed that Judge Beerman
had unfairly accommodated the prosecution‘s request to delay the trial until January on the notion that a trial during the
holiday season would be less likely to result in a conviction.
On the morning of December 7, 1990, Sheppard came to
chambers and declared that he would not work on the speedy
trial motion in the Williams case because of his belief that
the defendant was being ―railroaded.‖ Beerman responded
that, although Sheppard was not being discharged, if he felt
that way he should seek other employment.
In response, Sheppard called Judge Beerman a ―corrupt
son of a bitch,‖ but he quickly apologized for the characterization. Sheppard then informed Beerman that he had preserved extensive notes of other judicial misconduct by Beerman during the preceding four years. When asked by Judge
Beerman to provide examples, Sheppard noted a case that
Beerman had allegedly assigned to himself in order to exact
revenge against the accused. He told Judge Beerman that he
would go public with the notes if he was forced to resign.
Then Judge Beerman called Sheppard ―disturbed‖ and ―disloyal.‖ After the confrontation, Sheppard offered to go home
but Judge Beerman instructed him to work the rest of the day,
which he did.
Judge Beerman testified during his deposition that he
conferred with his son, an attorney, that evening, and decided
that he and Sheppard should part ways. Judge Beerman also
testified that he had resolved to speak with Administrative
Judge Alfred Lerner about the incident when he returned to
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the courthouse on the following Monday, December 10,
1990.
Sheppard did not show up for work that Monday. On
Tuesday, December 11, Judge Beerman met with Judge
Lerner about the incident. Judge Lerner was astonished by
Sheppard‘s behavior and confirmed Judge Beerman‘s view
that Sheppard could no longer remain in either Judge Beerman‘s employ, or indeed, in the employ of the court system.
When Sheppard arrived at work on December 11, four
days after the confrontation, court officers informed him that
Judge Beerman had fired him. Sheppard was forced to leave
immediately and was not allowed to take his belongings with
him. Several days later, Sheppard was permitted to return to
chambers, accompanied by court officers, to retrieve his personal belongings.254
The opinion quoted above is the third (and final) Second Circuit opinion in the Sheppard case.255 The first Sheppard appellate opinion
provides additional detail:
Both before and after his discharge . . . Sheppard‘s property
was searched by Beerman or by others at his direction. Specifically, Sheppard‘s file cabinets and desk drawers were
searched, and a box of his personal file cards was seized and
removed to Beerman‘s private office and examined . . . .
Following his discharge, Sheppard returned to Beerman‘s
courtroom on a number of occasions. On January 18, 1991,
while attending Beerman‘s calendar call, Sheppard began
ruffling through court files. Beerman subsequently directed
him to leave the courtroom if he wished to examine documents. On January 28, 1991, Beerman told an attorney not to
speak with Sheppard and warned Sheppard not to involve
himself in the cases Sheppard had worked on when he was a
clerk. On February 11, 1991, Sheppard was told not to keep
254. Id.
255. See Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Sheppard
I]; Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823 (2d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Sheppard II].
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coming in and out of the courtroom, and was told to be quiet
when he sought to reply to this direction.256
Sheppard sued Judge Beerman, asserting, among other things, that
the judge violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.257
In affirming the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to
Judge Beerman, the court of appeals pointed out that ―[a] government official may . . . fire an employee for speaking on a matter of
public concern if the employee‘s speech is reasonably likely to disrupt the effective functioning of the office, and the employee is fired
to prevent this disruption.‖258 In holding that Judge Beerman‘s prediction that Sheppard‘s speech would be disruptive, the court explained:
We stated in Sheppard II that ―[i]f a judge cannot believe that
his clerk is competent, loyal, and discreet, the working relationship between the two is not just injured, it is nonexistent.‖ 94 F.3d at 829. Indeed, in their role as employees, law
clerks amount to ―extensions of the judges at whose pleasure
they serve.‖ Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988)
(quoting Oliva v. Heller, 670 F. Supp. 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1987)). Thus, at the very minimum, a respectful, if not congenial, relationship between clerk and judge is a prerequisite
to a productive work environment within a judge‘s chambers.
During the incident in question, it is undisputed that
Sheppard yelled at Judge Beerman and called him an obscene
epithet. Sheppard‘s outburst was grossly disrespectful and an
expression of personal contempt for Judge Beerman. Given
the nature of the judge-clerk relationship, we conclude that
Judge Beerman‘s prediction that Sheppard‘s outburst would
disrupt the efficient operation of chambers was eminently
reasonable.259
256. Sheppard I, 18 F.3d at 150.
257. Sheppard III, 317 F.3d at 354.
258. Id. at 355 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987); Jeffries v.
Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1995)).
259. Sheppard III, 317 F.3d at 355.
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The court continued:
For similar reasons, we find that the potential disruptiveness to Judge Beerman‘s chambers outweighed whatever
value there was in Sheppard‘s speech. The vitriolic manner
in which Sheppard expressed himself, regardless of the substance of his remarks, made a harmonious working relationship between Sheppard and Beerman difficult to imagine.
Sheppard‘s use of the word ―corrupt‖ and his several references to Beerman‘s alleged misconduct during his invective
are not of sufficient import to outweigh the potential disruption his outburst caused.
Where an employee, such as Sheppard, ―holds an extremely confidential or highly placed advisory position, it
would be unlikely [for] the Pickering balance . . . to be struck
in his favor.‖ McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.
1997). Sheppard was undoubtedly in such a position here,
and we agree with the district court that the Pickering factors
favor Judge Beerman.260
One would think that most law clerks would be able to predict, without the benefit of an opinion from a federal court of appeals, that job
security is not enhanced by calling a judge a ―corrupt son of a bitch.‖
But now we know for certain.
Jakomas v. McFalls261 involved a less histrionic law clerk and a
seemingly much more culpable judge.262 The plaintiffs in that case,
―the former tipstaff, law clerk, and secretary for Judge Patrick H.
McFalls, Jr., of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania,‖263 alleged that they ―observed behavior indicating
that Judge McFalls was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
while performing his official duties.‖264 More specifically, they alleged that on one occasion, ―he arrived late to court, dressed in vaca260. Id. at 355–56 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
261. 229 F. Supp. 2d 412 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
262. Id. at 416.
263. Id. Sadly, I still have no clue what a ―tipstaff‖ might be, thus raising the
possibility—however slight—that I might be one myself, without even knowing it.
264. Id. at 417.
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tion clothes and sandals and still under the influence of alcohol,‖265
and that ―[d]uring the course of [a] jury trial, a bottle of vodka
dropped out of his pocket in front of people.‖266 Concerned about
the situation, ―Barbara Joseph [the judge‘s secretary and husband of
the judge‘s law clerk, James Joseph] confronted Judge McFalls
about his use of alcohol [and,] [a]ccording to the Amended Complaint, the Judge replied ‗Are you threatening me?‘‖267 Thereafter,
the secretary and law clerk told an administrative judge that Judge
McFalls ―was drunk at times while on the bench and while deciding
cases.‖268 Subsequently:
[Administrative] Judge James and President Judge Robert
Kelly scheduled a meeting with Judge McFalls to be held
upon his return from the Cayman Islands. Judge James told
the plaintiffs that he would confront Judge McFalls and give
him the opportunity to go to alcohol rehabilitation. If he refused, then Judge James would report the conduct to the Supreme Court.
On November 13, 2001, the plaintiffs telephoned Judge
McFalls in the Cayman Islands, and told him that Judge
James wanted to see him as soon as he returned. James Joseph told the Judge that he should be prepared because the
meeting was called to discuss his drinking behavior.
On the morning of November 14, 2001, an Allegheny
County Deputy Sheriff handed Barbara Joseph two envelopes—one for herself and one for her husband James. The
letters, dated November 13, 2001, stated: ―Effective immediately, you are discharged from your position.‖
The deputy sheriff then escorted Barbara Joseph from the
building, telling her that he had been ―instructed to deposit
[her] on the sidewalk outside the building.‖ According to the
Amended Complaint, Judge McFalls later called James Jo-

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id.
Jakomas, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
Id. at 418.
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seph and told him: ―I had to carpet bomb you, because you
wanted to send me to rehabilitation.‖269
In response to being carpet bombed, Judge McFalls‘s former secretary and law clerk (along with the tipstaff) sued ―Judge McFalls in
both his official and individual capacities‖ and Allegheny County,
asserting a free-speech claim under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and a claim under the Pennsylvania Whistleblower
law.270 Both defendants moved to dismiss, and, of the various
claims asserted, the court dismissed all but the free-speech claim
against Judge McFalls in his individual capacity.271
The law clerk in Graves v. Wayne County Third Circuit Court,272
Karen Graves, claimed that she was fired for missing too much time
due to her pregnancy.273 She sued the court in which she had
worked and the judge for whom she had worked, under Title VII.274
The defendants moved to dismiss, and prevailed, on grounds that, as
a law clerk, Graves was not an employee for purposes of Title VII.275
In Childress v. United States,276 a pro se law clerk ―employed by the
District Court for the District of South Carolina‖277 responded to his
termination by filing suit in state court against the Chief Deputy
Clerk of the federal court.278 Specifically, he ―allege[d] that Defendant Donelan prepared a performance appraisal containing defamatory statements and that these statements tortiously interfered with
his employment contract.‖279 Childress‘s suit took a brief detour,
but ended up going nowhere: ―The United States Attorney‘s office
269. Id. As I have indicated, the facts of this case were not proven by affidavit or
at trial but were drawn from the complaint. Still, one might reasonably assume
that there was least some fire to accompany the smoke, given that Judge McFalls
resigned his judicial office as part of an agreement to settle formal charges filed
against him by the Judicial Conduct Board. Id. at 419.
270. Id. at 416.
271. Id. at 431.
272. No. 08-11168, 2008 WL 3318726 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2008).
273. Id. at *1.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *3.
276. No. 3:07-cv-03312, 2008 WL 6716458 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2008).
277. Id. at *1.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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removed the case from state court to the federal district court.‖280 In
federal court, Donelan successfully moved to substitute the United
States as the defendant in the case,281 and then the United States was
granted dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity.282
Perhaps the most interesting instance of law-clerk litigation is the
one that unfolded in the District of Arizona. It is impossible to improve on the narrative provided by Judge Frederick Martone:
This is an action by Luz Hellman against Judge Sheldon
Weisberg pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of
her First Amendment rights, and against the State of Arizona
under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Arizona Civil
Rights Act, A.R.S. §§ 41-1461-67, alleging retaliation.
....
Hellman worked at the Arizona Court of Appeals as a
judicial assistant to Judge Jefferson Lankford. She married
him in 2001, and then resigned. In 2003, she rejoined the
court to work as a judicial assistant to Judge Donn Kessler.
She stated that she was ―finally in a position to get some
things changed around here,‖ that she was going to ―stir the
pot,‖ ―do something about Judge [Susan] Ehrlich,‖ and was
―in the process of contacting Judge Ehrlich‘s former law
clerks.‖
In 2005, Hellman met Regina Pangerl, a law clerk for
Judge Ehrlich. Pangerl told Hellman that Judge Ehrlich had
made discriminatory comments about Pangerl‘s Mormon religion. Hellman took it upon herself to contact Keith Stott,
the Executive Director of the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct, to discuss the matter. She later accompanied
Pangerl to meet with Stott so that Pangerl could file a complaint against Judge Ehrlich. Eventually, Pangerl transferred
from Judge Ehrlich‘s chambers to Judge Weisberg‘s chambers for the remainder of her clerkship term. On November
4, 2005, Pangerl filed a charge of discrimination with the
280. Id.
281. Id. at *5.
282. Childress, 2008 WL 6716458, at *5.
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (―EEOC‖)
against the State of Arizona, claiming religious discrimination and harassment by Judge Ehrlich.
On November 23, 2005, Judge Weisberg, then Chief
Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, wrote a memorandum informing his judicial colleagues of Pangerl‘s EEOC
claim.
Judge Weisberg‘s memorandum was marked
―CONFIDENTIAL‖ and provided, ―[o]f course, it goes without saying, that this is a confidential matter.‖ He stated that
―[b]ased upon the information and knowledge available to
me, I do not believe any of Pangerl‘s allegations.‖ He asked
the other judges to ―contact [him] immediately if [they had]
any information relevant to Pangerl‘s Charge of Discrimination. The memorandum was delivered to each Court of Appeals judge in an envelope marked ―confidential.‖ On November 25, 2005, Judge Lankford wrote a memorandum in
response to Judge Weisberg‘s, which he delivered in an
envelope marked ―confidential.‖ On November 27, 2005,
without obtaining permission from either judge, Hellman
made copies of the Weisberg and Lankford memoranda and
gave them to Pangerl. The next day an Associated Press reporter contacted Judge Weisberg about the judges‘ memoranda, and later that day an Associated Press story revealed
content from both memoranda.
After the memoranda were delivered to Pangerl and
leaked to the press, Hellman arranged a meeting with Judges
Weisberg, Kessler, and Gemmill to confess her role in the
leak. She tape-recorded the meeting without the judges‘
knowledge or consent. She admitted that she understood that
she was ―gonna get the eye from a lot of people, and [was]
okay with that.‖ She was insolent and rude to Judge Weisberg and called the Court of Appeals a ―gutless court that has
very little integrity.‖ She displayed a shockingly inappropriate understanding of her role at the court.
In response to her misappropriation and disclosure of the
memoranda, Judge Weisberg informed the other judges that
only Judge Kessler, her direct supervisor, had disciplinary
power over her. Exercising remarkable restraint, Judge Kess-
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ler chose not to terminate her for her gross insubordination.
Many employers would have escorted her out of the building.
He did conclude that her release of the two court memoranda
violated the Arizona Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees
and Rule 123, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court, both of
which require employees and judges to maintain the confidentiality of court and personnel information. Judge Kessler
informed Hellman that her disclosure of confidential court
memoranda could be deemed theft under state law, and stated
that he would put a note in her personnel file regarding the
incident.
Hellman claims that she suffered retaliation as a result of
disclosing the memoranda. She claims that she was reprimanded, threatened with termination and criminal prosecution, and shunned by her co-workers. She complained to
Judge Kessler about a hostile and retaliatory work environment. Judge Kessler in turn reported the complaints to Judge
Weisberg. Hellman claims to have experienced gastrointestinal problems, stress, and other medical problems.
On January 5, 2006, Hellman filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC claiming retaliation for engaging in
protected activity, which she described as ―providing two
memorandums [sic] to an employee who had filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC.‖ The Court of Appeals
engaged an independent lawyer to investigate Hellman‘s allegations. That lawyer concluded that Hellman‘s retaliation
allegations were unsubstantiated. In late September 2006,
Hellman resigned as a result of the ―continued ostracization
that she suffered.‖283
Hellman‘s suit made it out of the starting gate but got nowhere near
the finish line; Judge Martone granted the defendants‘ motions for
summary judgment.284 He ruled that the disclosure of confidential
283. Hellman v. Weisberg, No. CV-06-1465-PHX-FJM, 2007 WL 4218973, at
*1–2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2007), aff’d, 360 F. App’x. 776 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnotes
and citations to the record omitted).
284. Id. at *10.
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information, in clear violation of Hellman‘s duties as a law clerk,
was not a protected activity for purposes of a Title VII retaliation
claim,285 and that, for purposes of her First Amendment claim, the
misappropriation and disclosure of confidential memoranda between
judges was not constitutionally protected speech.286 For those of you
keeping score, Judge Martone‘s grant of summary judgment was
affirmed on appeal.287
IV. CONCLUSION
Every courtroom I have ever worked in has a special little desk
just for law clerks. But the lesson of this article is that, under the
right circumstances, law clerks can pop up almost anywhere else in a
courtroom, from the gallery to the witness box to the tables reserved
for litigants and their counsel.288 From my survey of law clerks out
of context, I have been able to distill some small bits of advice for
those who work at the elbows of judges.
First, for those who are disinclined to produce affidavits or to
testify, the best way to avoid being called on to give evidence is to
avoid having evidence to give. Given the typical subject matter of
law-clerk testimony, one of the best ways to remain untainted by
potential evidence is to avoid or minimize contact with litigants and
their counsel. Generally speaking, what happens in chambers stays
in chambers, but when law clerks communicate with people outside
chambers, they create the possibility of being asked to give evidence
about their communications. So, for all you law clerks out there,
285. Id. at *5.
286. Id. at *9.
287. Hellman v. Weisberg, 360 F. App‘x. 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2009).
288. Beyond that, there are legions of law clerks who have ended up in the best
seat in the house, on the bench, serving as judges. See Lucas v. United States, Cr.
No. 3:05-0760-MBS, 2010 WL 412554, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2010) (―The deposition of Judge Brian W. Jeffcoat, another former law clerk of Judge Westbrook . .
. .‖); Frances R. Hill, Constitutive Voting and Participatory Association: Contested Constitutional Claims in Primary Elections, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 571
(2010) (noting that William Rehnquist once served as a law clerk to Justice Robert
Jackson). One former law clerk who later landed on the bench is my father in law,
Herbert L. Chabot, who was the third U.S. Tax Court law clerk to later serve as a
Tax Court judge.
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tight lips can help keep you out of the witness box. If, however, you
cannot keep your lips buttoned because, for example, your judge
directs you to have contact with litigants or attorneys, it is always a
good idea not to say or write anything you would not be comfortable
reading in the Federal Reporter.
On the other hand, for those who might enjoy a trip to the witness box, the trick is to have evidence to give. There are not many
opportunities to acquire useful evidence, and the best ones arise
when you are sitting in the courtroom. Resist the urge to let your
mind wander, and keep an eagle eye on the litigants, the attorneys,
and the jury. You just might see something the court will need to
know about later.
My final piece of advice is for potential law-clerk plaintiffs.
Save yourself the filing fee. The courthouse is, indisputably, a great
place to work, but the courtroom is rarely a good place to seek relief
when your dream job turns into a nightmare.

